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Antipoverty efforts are persistently subverted by broad societal
contempt for poor people. The belief that poor people are morally and
behaviorally inferior, and that their personal failings are the cause of
their own poverty, is a staple of American opinion polls and political
rhetoric.1 This presumption is so widespread that it even permeates
antipoverty programs, which treat poor people with disdain even as
they offer aid and assistance.
Income discrimination creates not just social stigma, but legal
inequalities. The Supreme Court recognized some forty years ago that
welfare law promoted wealth-based Constitutional inequalities, and
responded by invoking the doctrines of equal protection and due
process to protect the rights of the poor.2 The Court grounded these
rulings in an affirmation of the human dignity of all people, regardless
of wealth. Yet these dignitary rulings have not prevented societal
discrimination against the poor from flourishing. This societal
discrimination has consistently undermined antipoverty initiatives
and turned programs meant to alleviate suffering into tools of
subordination.
Legal scholars have thoughtfully explored these issues in the
context of American welfare law. Public housing law has many
parallels to welfare law and, as this article discusses, adds a new
dimension to this area of study, as new and innovative forms of support
for the dignity of poor people have emerged in public housing law in
recent decades. Through mobilization, litigation, and law reform,
public housing residents have secured certain legal rights to self-
expression and autonomy that extend far beyond the dignitary rights
guaranteed by the Constitution. These dignitary innovations include
mechanisms of "voice," which give residents the right to engage with
1. See infra, Part II.
2. See infra, Part III.
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the government on matters impacting their lives, and mechanisms of
"choice," which offer residents certain controls over their housing.
Initiatives of voice and choice can be understood as successful
efforts by public housing residents to claim rights to greater autonomy
and self-determination. The dignitary rights promised by voice and
choice, however, have been consistently undermined by the persistent
belief in the moral and behavioral inferiority of poor people. This article
demonstrates how this pattern has repeated itself in public housing
policy over many decades, and how it continues to shape its future. It
explores the ways in which this approach misplaces the burden of
solving poverty on the individual, deflects attention away from
structural causes of poverty, validates governmental inaction and
negligence, and obstructs effective policymaking.
Part II analyzes the widespread belief that poor people are
morally deficient and responsible for their own poverty, popularly
known as the "culture of poverty" theory and referred to here as
"culturalism." In addition, Part II explores the origins and implications
of this belief.
Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's response to culturalism
as embodied in the welfare rights and due process cases of the late
1960s and early 1970s. It explains how these rulings sought to affirm
the dignity of aid recipients through legal doctrine, how these doctrines
have been applied in public housing, and how they have proven
inadequate to shield the poor from culturalism.
Part IV discusses how resident activism has extended the
dignitary principles espoused by the Court by creating new legal
supports for the poor within the public housing program. Certain
resident-driven initiatives empowered residents to exercise greater
self-determination and autonomy and have been codified in federal
law, providing residents across the country with expanded rights to
"voice" and "choice." These rights, however, have been consistently
subverted by culturalist ideology. Specifically, rights to participatory
governance are persistently undermined by the devaluation of the
opinions of poor people, and rights to self-management have been used
to seek moral reformation of the poor rather than to address their
housing needs.
Part V turns to housing mobility, a mechanism of "choice"
likely to be a significant component of the public housing program in
the future. Part V explains mobility's origins as rooted in dignitary
rights, but argues that a culturalist reading of mobility threatens to
subvert its original purposes, just as with other initiatives. Mobility is
at risk of being appropriated by culturalists to devalue poor people and
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communities, and to shift the responsibility for addressing poverty
from the government to poor individuals. Part V outlines concrete
recommendations for preventing such distortion as policymakers move
forward with designing and implementing mobility programs on a
national scale. The article concludes with a few thoughts on resisting
culturalism more broadly, suggesting that while specific changes in the
law are necessary, overcoming culturalism will require even greater
efforts.
II. CULTURALISM AND ITS HARMS
It is widely believed that poor people are responsible for their
own poverty. Personal failings of character, morality, and ways of
thinking are thought to lead to flawed behavior, which in turn causes
unemployment, impoverishment, and government expense.
3
Degrading labels such as "white trash" or "welfare queen" connote the
belief that poverty results from character flaws such as laziness or lack
of ambition, from a proclivity to violate moral norms, and from
unseemly life choices.4 Idealized notions about the strength of
American individualism,' reflected in rags-to-riches stories of those
who have "pulled themselves up by their bootstraps" in the "land of
3. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, REFORMING THE POOR (1972) (describing
theories of poverty and welfare programs that are derived from and also fuel moral
distinctions made between categories of poor people); JOEL F. HANDLER &
YEHESKEL HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE: WORK, POVERTY, AND WELFARE
(1997) 9-10 (describing and criticizing theories and stereotypes that claim that
poverty is caused by moral failings) [hereinafter Handler & Hasenfeld, We the Poor
People]; Martha Fineman, Images of Mothers in Poverty Discourse, 1991 DuKE L.J.
274,284 (1991) [hereinafter Fineman, Images of Mothers]; Michele Gilman, A Court
for the One Percent: How the Supreme Court Contributes to Economic Inequality,
2014 UTAH L. REV. 389, 453 (2014); Mark R. Rank, Toward a New Understanding
of American Poverty, 20 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 17, 20-21 (2006).
4. See Rank, supra note 3; see also Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and
Communitarianism: Toward a Community-Based Welfare System, 66 U. PITT. L.
REV. 721, 745 (2005); Thomas H. Koenig & Michael L. Rustad, Digital Scarlet
Letters: Social Media Stigmatization of the Poor and What Can Be Done, 93 NEB. L.
REV. 592,598 (2015).
5. See generally Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction
to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics, and Deep Capture,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 260-61 (2003) ("Americans have long seen their
individualism as... the most significant factor behind their relative economic and
political success," although "the individualism is as much the consequence of the
existence of a valuable situation."); MARTHA FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH 7-30
(2004) (describing individual autonomy and freedom from government action as one
of the foundational myths of American society).
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opportunity," reinforce the idea that a person can overcome hardship
as long as she strives hard enough to do so.6 Consequently, a person
who does not overcome poverty through determination and effort is
believed to be personally deficient.
These ideas have roots at least as far back as Elizabethan
England,7 when welfare policy favored the "deserving poor," or those
who were unable to work because of age, disability, or other
circumstances viewed as out of the individual's control.' The deserving
poor were distinguished from the "undeserving" able-bodied, who
presumably could work but did not.9
From their inception, American poverty programs carried
forward this deserving/undeserving dichotomy.' ° Welfare programs of
the 1830s separated out physically or mentally incapacitated people as
not at fault for their impoverishment. 11 Civil War era programs focused
on providing for orphans, widows, and veterans as the deserving
victims and heroes of war. 12 New Deal aid programs singled out the
"worthy"13 through the Social Security Act, which supported the
elderly, and through the public housing program, which at first
6. STEPHEN J. MCNAMEE & ROBERT K. MILLER, JR., THE MERITOCRACY
MYTH (2004); see also Mario Luis Small et. al., Reconsidering Culture and Poverty,
629 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 6, 9 (2010) (positing that beliefs in
American individualism may actually hinder economic and other gains, since social
networks contribute significantly to one's ability to secure jobs and other benefits).
7. See Mark Neal Aaronson, Scapegoating the Poor: Welfare Reform All Over
Again and the Undermining of Democratic Citizenship, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
213, 222 (1996).
8. Mark Neal Aaronson, Representing the Poor: Legal Advocacy and Welfare
Reform During Reagan's Gubernatorial Years, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 933, 985 (2013)
[hereinafter Aaronson, Representing the Poor].
9. Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking "Welfare Dependency" From a
Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 1963 (1993).
10. See Joel Handler & Yeheskel Hasenfeld, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF
POVERTY (1991); Michele Estrin Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 247, 256-60 (2014) [hereinafter Gilman, Welfare
Queen].
11. See Handler & Hasenfeld, We the Poor People, supra note 3, at 26.
12. Id.
13. Aaronson, Representing the Poor, supra note 8, at 985; see also William E.
Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1839 (2001).
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supported middle-class workers who had lost their jobs in the Great
Depression14 and later housed returning World War II veterans. 
15
In contrast to the "worthy" poor, the "unworthy" or
"undeserving" poor have been treated differently. Those deemed
"undeserving" include the seemingly able who do not work, 16 non-
widowed single mothers,17 and blacks and other racial minorities.'
The undeserving poor have been routinely excluded from aid or, to the
extent aid is given, viewed as causing their own poverty through their
"bad" behavior. Consequently, the state has sought to use aid programs
to contain and control how "undeserving" poor people live. 19 Just as
nineteenth-century American moral reformers sought to improve the
morality of the poor,20 welfare, food stamp, and Medicaid programs
have conditioned aid on meeting moral and behavioral norms,
2 '
especially as these programs supported increasing numbers of the
stigmatized poor. In the second half of the twentieth-century, the
14. See, e.g., Shelby D. Green, The Public Housing Tenancy: Variations on the
Common Law That Give Security of Tenure and Control, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 681,
688-89 (1994) (describing the new, visible, and undeserving class of poor people
that grew as a result of the Great Depression, and the Housing Act's role in
relieving this class' suffering); Michael S. FitzPatrick, Note, A Disaster in Every
Generation: An Analysis of HOPE VI: HUD's Newest Big Budget Development Plan,
7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 421, 428 (2000).
15. See Florence Wagman Roisman, National Ingratitude: The Egregious
Deficiencies of the United States' Housing Programs for Veterans and the "Public
Scandal"of Veterans' Homelessness, 38 IND. L. REV. 103, 127-33 (2005).
16. See, e.g., JOEL F. HANDLER, REFORMING THE POOR: WELFARE POLICY,
FEDERALISM, AND MORALITY 2 (1972); Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State:
Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 331 (2014)
[hereinafter Bach, Hyperregulatory State].
17. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 3.
18. See, e.g., JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM
UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994) (tracing how racial issues have shaped
the American welfare state throughout its history); Mary Pattillo, Making Fair
(Public) Housing Claims in a Post-Racism Legal Context, 18 J. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 215, 220 (describing the violent reaction to the
placement of black veterans in white neighborhoods in Chicago public housing).
19. Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare
Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719,720-21(1992) ("[T]he current 'welfare reform'
proposals condition . . . eligibility on conformity with putative moral norms of
society .... The idea behind all of these [welfare reform] projects is the same: only
those women and children who conform to majoritarian middle-class values deserve
government assistance benefits.").
20. See Gene R. Nichol, Poverty and Equality: A Distant Mirror, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 1661, 1663 (2002).
21. See, e.g., HANDLER, REFORMING THE POOR, supra note 16, at 2; Bach,
Hyperregulatory State, supra note 16, at 331.
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"undeserving" poor sought benefits in unprecedented numbers due to
the migration of black Americans to northern cities, widespread urban
unemployment, an increase in female-headed families, and enrollment
drives encouraged through the War on Poverty. 22 As the numbers grew,
the government used food and shelter as bargaining chips to control
how poor people lived their private lives. For example, states asked
single mothers, most of whom were black, to sacrifice fundamental
liberties and privacies in exchange for government aid:
Between 1954 and 1960 at least nineteen states
attempted to deny ADC ["Aid to Dependent Children"]
to illegitimate children. In a similar vein, many states
proposed laws conditioning children's ADC payments
on the mother's behavior: her agreement to file
nonsupport paperwork, establish the paternity of the
child, cease "illicit" relationships, undergo
sterilization, accept available employment, participate
in rehabilitative treatment, and submit to
fingerprinting.23
As the number of welfare recipients increased from two million
in 1950 to nine million in 1970,24 concerted efforts were made to protect
the dignity of the poor through the expansion of civil rights, welfare
rights, due process, and other avenues.25 These efforts produced some
crucial changes in how government treated aid recipients, but
culturalism continued to flourish. President Ronald Reagan's revival
of the narrative of the "welfare queen,"26 understood to refer to "an
urban, black, teenage mother, who continually has children to increase
her benefits and who just lies around all day in public housing waiting
for her check to come,' 2 7 epitomizes culturalist thinking. Culturalist
ideology continued to shape national policy in the 1990s, as welfare
22. See Handler & Hasenfeld, We the Poor People, supra note 3, at 31-32;
Williams, supra note 19, at 724-25.
23. Karen M. Tani, Administrative Equal Protection: Federalism, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the Rights of the Poor, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 825, 864-
65 (2015) (citations omitted).
24. Handler, We the Poor People, supra note 3, at 31.
25. See, e.g., Forbath, supra note 13, at 1841-67; FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE
BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA (2007)
(describing the history of welfare rights activism in America in the 1960s and early
1970s).
26. Gilman, Welfare Queen, supra note 10, at 249; Bridgette Baldwin,
Stratification of the Welfare Poor: Intersections of Gender, Race, & "Worthiness" in
Poverty Discourse and Policy, 6 MOD. AM. 4, 5 (2010)
27. Dethroning the Welfare Queen: The Rhetoric of Reform, 107 HARV. L. REV.
2013, 2019 (1994).
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reform focused on familiar themes of morality and behavioral control
by putting aid recipients to work 28 and reducing sexual behavior
outside of marriage.29 Today's programs continue to treat poor people
as responsible for poverty's harms and as needing careful government
oversight.30
Culturalist ideology has a superficial simplicity. It suggests
that social regulation is a fair trade for government support: if you
want a free ride, you must play by the state's rules. The subordinating
implications of this premise, however, are complex. Culturalism
stigmatizes the acceptance of government support by the poor as
pernicious and irresponsible, while similar behavior among the more
affluent is widely acceptable. For example, mortgage interest and
property tax deductions31 are government benefits that, like welfare,
enable people to buy what they could not otherwise afford, yet impose
no stigma or moral constraints. Moreover, although the state does have
a responsibility to encourage socially responsible behavior, other forms
of regulation like business or criminal regulation are inherently
different from welfare regulation, which conditions the relief of human
suffering on conformance to moral and social norms and on the sacrifice
of fundamental personal freedoms.
32
In singling out the poor as morally and behaviorally deficient,
culturalism also provides thin cover for the perpetuation of noxious
28. See, e.g., Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting
Definitions From Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 688, 734 (1998) (noting that from 1970 forward, various welfare programs
focused on tying welfare benefits to employment); Elizabeth G. Patterson, Mission
Dissonance in the TANF Program: Of Work, Self-Sufficiency, Reciprocity, and the
Work Participation Rate, 6 HARV. L. & POLY REV. 369 (2012); Gilman, Welfare
Queen, supra note 10.
29. See, e.g., Wendy Chavkin et al., Sex, Reproduction and Welfare Reform,
7 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 379 (2000) (stating that various provisions of the
1996 welfare reform act cap welfare and Medicaid benefits to family size and
provide incentives to states who show a decrease in out of wedlock births without
an accompanying increase in abortion rates); Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual
Regulation Dimension of Contemporary Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview,
8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 122 (2002).
30. See supra Part III.C.; see also Bach, Hyperregulatory State, supra
note 16.
31. See, e.g., Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on the Prairie: The
Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1350
(2000).
32. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that the rational basis test, used to assess the
constitutionality of business regulation, is an inappropriate standard to use when
assessing a state's refusal to support the "vital" needs of impoverished children).
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racial and gender stereotypes. While discrimination based on race,
gender, and income are distinct and not coextensive, they frequently
overlap.33 Poor people are disproportionately non-white with single,
female heads of households, and prejudice against each of these
characteristics is frequently compounded. For example, non-whites,
and especially black Americans, are considered particularly
"undeserving' among the poor.34 Single mothers are also deemed
especially undeserving because they violate multiple gender-based
values favoring marriage and non-working mothers.
35
Culturalism can be seen as an expression of white, middle-class
"cultural imperialism," which "universalizes a dominant group's
experience, culture, and meanings in a way that renders the
perspective of another group invisible while simultaneously marking
them as the deviant and inferior Other."36 These messages can be so
powerful that even those who they denigrate may subscribe to their
beliefs.37 This may in fact be part of their purpose; as Stephen J.
McNamee and Robert K. Miller, Jr. write,
Ideology provides a socially acceptable explanation for
the kind and extent of inequality within society ....
For a system of inequality to be stable, those who have
more must convince those who have less that the
distribution of who gets what is fair, just, proper, or the
natural order of things. The greater the level of
33. This article primarily refers to income discrimination, but by doing so does
not intend to conflate income, race, and gender discrimination, nor does it intend to
overlook the intersectionalities among them or present income discrimination as
unrelated to race or gender bias.
34. See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA,
AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 5 (1999) (noting that white cynical view
regarding welfare is paralleled by stereotypes regarding African Americans).
35. See id.; Fineman, supra note 3; Linda Gordon, Pitied But Not Entitled:
Single Mothers and the History of Welfare 1890-1935; MIMI ABRAMOVITZ,
REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN (1989) ("[Tlhe ideology of women's roles...
became encoded within the rules and regulations of the welfare state, where it,
along with the work ethic, has shaped public policy and regulated the lives of
thousands of women.").
36. Audrey McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The Geography of Economic
Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 342-43 (1999).
37. See WILSON JULIUS WILSON, MORE THAN JUST RACE: BEING BLACK AND
POOR IN THE INNER CITY (2009) 82-85 (discussing research indicating that many
poor people agree with culturist beliefs, including that "America is a land of
opportunity where anybody can get ahead, and that individuals get pretty much
what they deserve").
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inequality, the more compelling and persuasive these
explanations must appear to be.3
In these and other ways, culturalism is deeply subordinating.
It expresses both personalized condemnation, since failure stems from
the character of the individual, as well as condemnation of broader
"cultural" values, since deficiencies are also thought to be collectively
fostered among groups as a shared culture.39 Personal and cultural
failings are presumed to be nearly universal and to be intrinsic,
persistent, and self-perpetuating.4 ° At the same time, each individual
is presumed to have irresponsibly chosen to be poor, and to have the
38. McNamee and Miller, supra note 6; see also JOEL F. HANDLER &
YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY, 11 (1991)
(describing social welfare policy as "fundamentally a set of symbols that try to
differentiate between the deserving and undeserving poor in order to uphold such
dominant values as the work ethic and family, gender, race, and ethnic relations.
In this sense, social welfare policy is targeted not only at the poor, but equally at
the nonpoor.").
39. Popular culturalism, as discussed in this article, is distinguishable from
the scholarly work of sociologists who have articulated nuanced understandings of
what "culture" means, how it may affect those in poverty, and how perspectives on
culture have shaped American social policy. See, e.g., Wilson, supra note 37
(discussing the cultural significance of being black and poor in a city); Alford A.
Young Jr., New Life for an Old Concept: Frame Analysis and the Reinvigoration of
Studies in Culture and Poverty, 629 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 53, 55
(2010); Stephen Vaisey, What People Want: Rethinking Poverty, Culture, and
Educational Attainment, 629 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 75 (2010). The
recent work of William Julius Wilson, for example, suggests that culture
encompasses not only "group norms, values, and attitudes toward family and work,
[but also] cultural repertoires (habits, styles, and skills) and the micro-level
processes of meaning making and decision making-that is, the way individuals in
particular groups, communities, or societies develop an understanding of how the
world works and makes decisions based on that understanding." See Wilson, supra
note 37, at 151. Wilson argues that both cultural forces and structural forces trap
people in poverty, but that structural causes are primary and, moreover, that
structural disadvantages are why cultural disadvantages develop. See id. at 133-
35, 152 ("Culture matters, but I would have to say that it does not matter nearly as
much as social structure. Culture is less causally autonomous than social structure,
more often playing a mediating role in determining individuals' life outcomes.").
40. See, e.g., Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING
POVERTY: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Daniel Patrick Moynihan
ed. 1968) [hereinafter Lewis, The Culture of Poverty] (stating that the culture of
poverty "tends to perpetuate itself from generation to generation because . . . [b]y
the time slum children are age six or seven, they have usually absorbed the basic
values and attitudes of their subculture, and are not psychologically geared to take
advantage of changing conditions or increased opportunities which may occur in
their lifetime").
[47.2:1
Poverty, Dignity, and Public Housing
power to escape poverty if only she would exercise sufficient will and
responsibility.
By locating the cause of poverty in the individual, culturalism
also places responsibility on the individual to solve poverty.
Culturalism thus deflects attention from those powerful "structural"
causes of poverty that are circumstantial and external to the
individual.4 ' Structural causes of poverty include racial discrimination,
racial segregation, the overall decline in low-skill jobs due to
industrialization, technology, and globalization, grossly inadequate
public schools, disproportionate rates of incarceration, language
differences, the spatial mismatch between jobs and where people live,
the unreliability of public transit, a lack of affordable child care, and
inadequate access to medical care, to name just a few.42 Culturalism
omits or strongly deemphasizes these external causes of poverty, which
are beyond the control of any individual and cannot be expected to be
overcome through will and determination. Moreover, culturalism
denies the role of the state itself in creating and reinforcing structural
causes of poverty.43 In doing so, culturalism deflects responsibility
away from the government to address the barriers to work and
opportunity that it helps to create, and places the titanic burden of
overcoming broad historical, societal, and economic forces on the very
people who are already suffering from their effects.
41. Bach, Hyperregulatory State, supra note 16, at 325; Matthew Diller, The
Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial
Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1144 (2000); Wendy A. Bach, Governance,
Accountability, and the New Poverty Agenda, 2010 Wis. L. REV. 239, 277-78 (2010);
Wilson, supra note 34, at 46. For a number of reasons, scholars, politicians, and
others frequently emphasize either cultural or structural causes of poverty to the
exclusion of the other, without acknowledging that both may be at work
simultaneously. See Wilson, supra note 37, at 20-24, 135-38; Joel F. Handler,
REFORMING THE POOR 6 (1972) (suggesting that the primary difference between
culturalists and structuralists is that the former emphasize the reform of the poor
as the solution to poverty, while structuralists seek to change poor peoples'
environment).
42. A comprehensive list of structural barriers to employment is not possible
here, but for discussions of structural circumstances leading to poverty in poor and
minority urban areas, see McFarlane, supra note 36, at 333-34; Dawinder S. Sidhu,
The Unconstitutionality of Urban Poverty, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 16-24 (2012).
43. Jennifer Pokempner & Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, Welfare Reform, and
the Meaning of Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 425, 445 (2001) ("[A] structural analysis
of poverty... would require acknowledging the degree to which the state indeed
does intervene in the economy in ways that maintain the current racial patterns
and class power, and that different forms of intervention could create more
equitable social and economic relations.").
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In sum, culturalism stigmatizes the poor, devalues their belief
systems, and justifies the perpetuation of inequality. As expressed
through the law of public aid programs, it subjects the poor to extensive
intrusions upon their privacy and liberty. To rebut culturalism, some
have sought to expand the law's recognition of the dignity of the poor.
44
Dignity is an appropriate antidote to culturalist degradations, as it is
widely associated with individual liberty and autonomy,
4 privacy,46
equality,47 and the decent treatment by society of its members.48 It is
considered to be inherent to each human49 and worthy of respect and
recognition by other humans and the government.5 ° Dignity is what
"gives each of us equal standing against arbitrary government action
that demeans, humiliates, and degrades."51 Thus, dignity provides a
basis for challenging culturalist laws.
Legal scholars have questioned whether human dignity has a
meaning independent of other concepts, such as autonomy, privacy, or
equality,5 2 but even if it does not, the term holds significance in legal
discourse. The Supreme Court has invoked dignity in discussing the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments,53 and the concept of dignity is useful as an
44. See infra Part III.
45. See, e.g., id. at 744-53; Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity,
and Safety: The Impact of Domestic Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOZO L.
REV. 519, 545-46 (2010); Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 65, 110 (2011) (stating that a "unifying theme" is that "dignity
embodies the principle of an individual's entitlement to exercise his free will.").
46. See Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance,
33 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 378, 383 (2003). Autonomy and privacy are sometimes
seen as related, although they can also be distinguished. See Louis Henkin, Privacy
and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1410-11 (1974) (distinguishing "privacy-
freedom from official intrusion" from "something essentially different and farther-
reaching, an additional zone of autonomy, of presumptive immunity to
governmental regulation").
47. Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
169, 222 (2011); Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 669 (2005); Glensy, supra note 45, at 130.
48. Henry, supra note 47, at 222.
49. See Glensy, supra note 45, at n. 57 (discussing Immanuel Kant's belief
that dignity derives from sentience); Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in
Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 749 (2006).
50. See Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law,
86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 187 (2011); Bracey, supra note 47; Glensy, supra note
45, at 86.
51. Goodman, supra note 49, at 751.
52. See id. at 126-27; Rao, supra note 50, at 190.
53. See Henry, supra note 47, at 173; Goodman, supra note 49.
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organizing or centering principle.5 4 It is used for that purpose in this
article. The term "dignitary rights" is used to refer to affirmative
support in the law for the autonomy, privacy, and equality of people
seeking or receiving public assistance.
III. COUNTERING CULTURALISM WITH DIGNITY
The promotion of dignitary rights as a legal strategy for
combatting culturalism in welfare programs has been traced back to
New Deal-era social work theories55 and to writings by other influential
non-lawyers.56 From the New Deal through the 1960s, culturalism at
the state level was resisted by some federal welfare agency lawyers
who promulgated theories of equal protection for the poor.57 Dignitary
rights became a national focus as the civil rights movement established
new rights for racial minorities and as President Johnson's War on
Poverty galvanized policymakers, activists, and legal scholars around
welfare reform."
Not coincidentally, there was also a strong backlash against
culturalism at this time. Controversy swirled around an internal 1965
Department of Labor paper known as the "Moynihan Report," which
described the breakdown of the black family as at the center of a
"tangle of pathology" and as the "principal source of most of the
aberrant, inadequate, or anti-social behavior that did not establish, but
now serves to perpetuate the cycle of poverty and deprivation."59 The
report was widely castigated as promoting the idea of a culture of
54. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARv. L. REV. 747, 749
(2011) ("The introduction of a third overarching term like 'dignity' that
acknowledges the links between liberty and equality is overdue .... We need to
look past doctrinal categories [such as 'equality' claims made on equal protection
grounds and 'liberty' claims made on due process grounds] to see that the rights
secured within those categories are often hybrid rights."); Glensy, supra note 45, at
127.
55. See William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights,
44 MD. L. REV. 1, 4 (1985); Susan D. Bennett, "No Relief but upon the Terms of
Coming into the House": Controlled Spaces, Invisible Disentitlements, and
Homelessness in an Urban Shelter System, 104 YALE L.J. 2157, 2185-86 (1995)
[hereinafter Bennett, No Relief].
56. See Nichol, supra note 20, at 1663 (citing the work of Jane Addams, Walter
Rauschenbusch, William Ryan, and Frances Fox Piven).
57. See Tani, supra note 23, at 845-51.
58. See Forbath, supra note 13, at 1822.
59. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR
NATIONAL ACTION 29-30 (1965).
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poverty and for blaming the victims of poverty for their
circumstances. 60
It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court began
considering how the government should treat welfare applicants and
recipients. At the time, a welfare administrator could deny a person
aid merely because her life choices offended the officer's personal sense
of morality. For example, caseworkers had broad discretion to
determine if children were being raised in a "suitable family home,"
which was generally interpreted as having married parents and
sometimes as requiring that children receive religious instruction.61 In
some states, women were subject to warrantless midnight searches by
program administrators to discover whether there was a "man-in-the-
house" who provided financial support.62 Officials routinely denied
60. The Moynihan Report was associated with the recent work of Oscar Lewis.
See Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, at 187-200; OSCAR LEWIS, FIVE FAMILIES:
MEXICAN CASE STUDIES IN THE CULTURE OF POVERTY (1959); OSCAR LEWIS, LA
VIDA: A PUERTO RICAN FAMILY IN THE CULTURE OF POVERTY IN SAN JUAN AND NEW
YORK (1966). Although the term "culture of poverty" is today often used to refer to
culturalist ideology, the ideas of Moynihan and Lewis can be substantively
distinguished from culturalism to the extent that they explicitly acknowledge
structural causes of poverty, such as slavery and chronic unemployment. However,
they also argued that poor people developed psychological or cultural attitudes that
perpetuated their own poverty, among other things, which caused political backlash
from liberals and enabled conservatives to appropriate their work in support of
culturalist ideology. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR 19-20,
41, 45 (1989); William Julius Wilson, The Moynihan Report and Research on the
Black Community, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 34, 39 (2009)
(discussing numerous factors causing the backlash against the Moynihan Report,
despite its recognition of the structural causes of poverty); Wilson, supra note 37,
at 152 ("A social scientist who incorporates culture in a comprehensive framework
on race and poverty has an obligation to highlight the powerful impact of structural
forces because cultural explanations are more likely to resonate with the general
public and policy makers."); Joshua Guetzkow, Beyond Deservingness:
Congressional Discourse on Poverty, 1964-1996, 629 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
Soc. SCI. 173, 175 (2010) (differentiating the 1960s "culture-of-poverty" theory from
the culturalist ideology of the 1980s and 1990s); LEWIS, LA VIDA, p. xii
(acknowledging the "danger that my findings might be ... used to justify prejudices
and negative stereotypes."). The backlash was so strong that social scientists shied
away from discussing "culture" until the late 1980s, when William Julius Wilson
reintroduced the topic in 1987. See Jasmin Sethi, Lessons for Social Scientists and
Politicians: An Analysis of Welfare Reform, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLICY 5,
13-14 (2010); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987).
61. See Roger E. Kohn, AFDC Eligibility Requirements Unrelated to Need: The
Impact of King v. Smith, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1219, 1220-21 (1970).
62. See, e.g., Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone:
Subconstitutional Status and the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355, 367
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benefits based on arbitrary standards, such as whether an official
suspected that the applicant had crossed state lines to access benefits63
and whether the recipient pledged loyalty to the government.'
Similarly arbitrary standards were applied in the public
housing program at the time. Admission could be denied on the basis
of race, personal demeanor, and family composition. 65 Officials refused
to admit or evicted people who were unmarried mothers,66 received
welfare benefits,67 were seen as threats to the morals of others,6 s
refused to take loyalty oaths,69 were elected as tenant advocates,70 or
held social gatherings,7 1 as well as those whose family members were
incarcerated,7 2 gang members,7 3 or drug addicts.74 In short,
government administrators exercised extremely broad discretion to
withhold aid from those they deemed morally or otherwise unworthy.
a. Conditions Cases and the Due Process Revolution
Legal scholars have scrutinized the conditioning of aid on
arbitrary standards and the extensive governmental intrusions into
the private lives of the poor. Professor Charles Reich published a series
of articles setting forth a dignity-based rationale for protecting aid
(2010) (explaining that in the decades following the Great Depression, social
workers in many jurisdictions were empowered to make unannounced home visits).
63. See Forbath, supra note 13, at 1840.
64. See Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1250 (1965) [hereinafter Reich, Individual Rights].
65. See IRWIN DEUTSCHER, The Gatekeeper in Public Housing, in AMONG THE
PEOPLE: ENCOUNTERS WITH THE POOR 38-52 (1968).
66. See Green, supra note 14, at 735; Lewis v. Housing Auth., 397 F.2d 178,
179 (5th Cir. 1968); Robin Minter Smyers, High Noon in Public Housing: The
Showdown Between Due Process Rights and Good Management Practices in the War
on Drugs and Crime, 30 URB. LAW. 573, 579-80 (1998); Public Landlords and
Private Tenants: The Eviction of "Undesirables" From Public Housing Projects,
77 YALE L.J. 988, 990 (1968).
67. See Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 134, 137
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
68. See Reich, supra note 64, at 1250.
69. See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 742 (1964)
[hereinafter Reich, The New Property].
70. See Undesirables, supra note 66, at n.18; Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of City of
Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 268 (1969) (noting that petitioner received a lease
cancellation notice the day after being elected president of a tenant's organization).
71. See Undesirables, supra note 66, at n.10.
72. See Smyers, supra note 66, at 583.
73. See Undesirables, supra note 66, at 990.
74. See id. at n.16.
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recipients against governmental abuse7 5 and raising concerns of
privacy, freedom of speech, and equal protection.76 These issues were
also brought to the attention of the Supreme Court in the late 1960s
and early 1970s, when the Court articulated new dignitary rights for
recipients of public assistance through a series of welfare rights cases
and through another series of cases known collectively as "the due
process revolution." Some cases focused on the legality of placing
certain conditions on the receipt of government benefits, 7 7 while others
focused on the procedural protections applicable to government
decision-making.
The conditions cases limited the behavioral controls that a
state could impose on aid recipients. In 1968, in King v. Smith, the
Court struck down "man-in-the-house" rules denying welfare benefits
to a woman who cohabited with a man on the presumption that the
man would provide financial support and make state assistance
unnecessary.78 Striking these rules as an arbitrary moral sanction
unrelated to the statutory goal of supporting needy children,79 King
broke ground by clarifying that the regulation of morality is a separate
and distinct project from the relief of poverty. However, its application
75. See Charles A. Reich, Midnight Welfare Searches and the Social Security
Act, 72 YALE L.J. 1347 (1963) (regarding affronts to privacy and dignity in welfare
searches). Other influential works include Individual Rights, supra note 64
(studying the basic legal issues underlying decisions affecting recipients of public
assistance and other welfare beneficiaries), and The New Property, supra note 69
(exploring changes in government largess and its consequences to individuals and
society). Reich had connections to the federal welfare agency lawyers who supported
equal protection for aid recipients. See Tani, supra note 23, at 884. For other legal
scholarship of the time arguing for constitutional protections for the poor, see Frank
I. Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969) (discussing whether the Supreme Court has handled the
War on Poverty as carefully as it ought to have done), and Frank I. Michelman, In
Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121
U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973) (analyzing Rawls' Theory of Justice).
76. Reich highlighted the public housing system as egregiously unjust because
of the discretion afforded to local officials and the lack of procedural safeguards over
that discretion. See Reich, Individual Rights, supra note 64, at 1250.
77. "Conditions" cases focus not only on public assistance benefits, but also on
other government benefits on which conditions are placed. See, e.g., Note,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989).
78. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 334 (1968). King is also significant because
it acknowledged a welfare recipient's right to sue state agencies to enforce federal
statutory provisions under 42 U.S.C. 1983. See Aaronson, supra note 8, at 994.
79. See King, 392 U.S. at 334; see also Thomas v. Hous. Auth., 282 F. Supp.
575, 581 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (holding the denial of public housing benefits to unwed
mothers invalid as overbroad and inconsistent with the purpose of the program).
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has been relatively limited, since it was decided on statutory grounds
and not on grounds of constitutional dignity, and just a few years later
the Court upheld other warrantless home visits as not unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment.
80
Another important conditions case, Shapiro v. Thompson,
struck down the use of durational residency requirements to deny
welfare benefits, unless necessary to promote a compelling state
interest, on the grounds that they impermissibly penalized a poor
person's constitutional right to travel."' Shapiro repudiated such
"invidious discrimination" against the poor and its precedent in the
Elizabethan Poor Laws,8 2 and relied on the Equal Protection Clause to
establish that the poor have the same liberty interests as the more
affluent, and that the government cannot force them to sacrifice those
rights in exchange for aid. 83
In these and other conditions cases, the Court took a stand
against culturalism's conflation of poverty with blame and immorality
and established a legally-protected sphere of dignity for the poor. Over
time, other conditions on aid have been struck down, while still others
have been upheld, but overall these cases have sought to establish
dignitary rights by making constitutional guarantees equally
applicable to the poor. 84
The Court also sought to rebuff culturalism through
constitutional procedural rights. Procedure is thought to promote
human dignity in that it can serve to "establish a just society [and] to
enable all people to participate fully in our democracy without
limitations imposed by a lack of economic resources or political
power."8 5  Professor Reich's influential works also articulated
procedural arguments, contending that while administrative law
protected businesses and the non-poor from governmental abuses of
power, it failed to protect the privacy and liberty rights of aid
recipients.
8 6
80. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971).
81. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) overruled in part by
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
82. Id. at 628 and n.7.
83. See id. at 627.
84. See Lynn A. Baker, The Prices of Rights: Toward a Positive Theory of
Unconstitutional Conditions, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1185 (1990).
85. Rebecca E. Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process: Countering the Due
Process Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 9, 14 (1997) [hereinafter Zietlow,
Giving Substance].
86. See id. at 16.
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Reich drew upon changing notions of property8 7 to define
property rights held by the poor in government benefits and to argue
for the application of procedural protections to respect those rights.
88
The Court cited Reich's work in the landmark procedural case of
Goldberg v. Kelly, 9 decided in 1970, which considered what process
was due when a state agency terminated welfare benefits. The litigant
had conceded that due process was statutorily required, so the narrow
question for the Court was whether, in the context of the welfare
program, constitutional due process required a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing. Goldberg held that a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing was indeed required9 ° so that welfare recipients could hear the
charges against them, present their side of the story, cross-examine
witnesses and evidence, and have counsel present.91
In writing for the majority, Justice Brennan drew explicitly on
the concept of dignity to pen a decidedly anti-culturalist statement:
From its founding, the Nation's basic commitment has
been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons
within its borders. We have come to recognize that
forces not within the control of the poor contribute to
their poverty. This perception, against the background
of our traditions, has significantly influenced the
development of the contemporary public assistance
system. Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of
subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor
the same opportunities that are available to others to
participate meaningfully in the life of the community.
At the same time, welfare guards against the societal
malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of
unjustified frustration and insecurity. Public
assistance, then, is not mere charity, but a means to
"promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings
87. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Government Benefits and the
Rule of Law: Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
107, 110 (2005).
88. Since government defines what property is, Reich argued, government
was responsible for the disparity between the wealthy and the poor, and
consequently, welfare is a "right that society owes to poor people." Reich, The New
Property, supra note 69; see also Undesirables, upra note 64.
89. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, n.8 (1970) (quoting Reich's Individual
Rights and citing The New Property); see also Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of
Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 919 (2000).
90. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264.
91. See id. at 267-68; see also Randal S. Jeffrey, The Importance of Due
Process Protections After Welfare Reform: Client Stories From New York City,
66 ALB. L. REV. 123, 125 (2002).
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of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." The same
governmental interests that counsel the provision of
welfare, counsel as well its uninterrupted provision to
those eligible to receive it; pre-termination evidentiary
hearings are indispensable to that end. 92
The Court explicitly emphasized the connection between
dignity, welfare, and due process, tying these concepts to constitutional
equality and liberty.93 Strikingly, it also linked these concepts to the
understanding that "forces not within the control of the poor contribute
to their poverty,"94 expressly embracing the structuralist view of
poverty and repudiating culturalism's blame of the individual.
Moreover, the Court characterized the "malaise," "frustration," and
"insecurity" experienced by the poor as problems caused by poverty,95
not as causes of poverty intrinsic to the poor person's character, as
culturalist ideology would purport. Even more importantly, the Court
refuted the culturalist belief that responsibility lies with the individual
to solve her own poverty. Rather, it cited the Preamble to the
Constitution to indicate that that burden rests with the government. 96
Goldberg represents a high point in the Court's support for the
dignity of aid recipients.97 In the years immediately after Goldberg, the
Court also issued other important procedural opinions9" addressing
notice-and-comment requirements under the Administrative
92. Goldberg, at 264-65 (citations omitted).
93. See id. at 265.
94. Id. (citing Reich's Individual Rights).
95. Id. This approach aligns to some extent with that of some contemporary
sociologists, who argue that specific "cultural" traits do exist among the poor, but
that they are caused by poverty and other structural injustices. See supra text
accompanying note 39.
96. The preamble to the U.S. Constitution reads in full:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare,
and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.
97. See Goodman, supra note 49, at 784 ("After Goldberg, the Court's
willingness to advance human dignity in welfare rights cases faltered.").
98. See U.S. v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742, 757-58 (1972);
U.S. v. Fl. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 240 (1973); Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978); see also Reich, Individual Rights, supra
note 64, at 1252 (stating that rules should be "clearly formulated in advance of any
action"); Henry J. Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975)
(exploring early ramifications of Goldberg for rulemaking).
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Procedures Act,9 9 as discussed below. 100 But since Goldberg, scholars
have documented a scarcity of Supreme Court support for poor
people. 101 Moreover, despite its strong anti-culturalist stance, Goldberg
itself suffers some debilitating limitations that make it an inadequate
tool for combating culturalism, as will be discussed. Even so, the cases
of the Goldberg era are important for their affirmation that the poor
have equal substantive and procedural rights as the more affluent, and
for placing some boundaries on the use of aid to regulate the lives of
the poor. These cases represent a strong repudiation of culturalist
ideology through an embrace of dignitary rights.
b. Applications in Public Housing
The Court's dignitary rulings, primarily decided in the context
of welfare, have for the most part been seamlessly translated to the
public housing context. Below is a very brief introduction to the public
housing program and a short discussion of how the Court's doctrines
are applicable to public housing. A critique of how culturalism has
subverted these doctrines follows in the next section.
Public housing is a federal program developed, administered,
and funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) and implemented by local housing agencies,
which are usually instrumentalities of the city or county
government.10 2 A public housing unit is traditionally a brick-and-
mortar unit, built in a fixed location, and owned and operated by the
local agency. Local agencies depend almost exclusively on federal funds
to carry out the program and thus must follow highly prescriptive
99. Administrative Procedure Act § 10a, 5 U.S.C. 1009.
100. See infra Part IV.a.ii.
101. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Law and Equality: Poverty Lawyering in the
Golden Age, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1401, 1421 n.96 (1995) (stating that from 1980 to
1995, "Supreme Court decisions on public benefits issues have mostly taken the
form of reversals of lower court decisions in favor of poor people"); Maxine D.
Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Jurisprudence,
84 NEB. L. REV. 740 (2006); Michele Gilman, A Court for the One Percent: How the
Supreme Court Contributes to Economic Inequality, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 389, 393
(2014) ("Supreme Court doctrine has reinforced economic inequality in the areas of
education, redistribution, corporate law, and the political process.").
102. Approximately 3,100 local agencies nationwide own and manage public
housing. Facts About Public Housing, THE COUNCIL OF LARGE PUBLIC HOUSING
AUTHORITIES, http://www.clpha.org/facts-abouLpublic-housing (last visited Nov.
30, 2015). These entities are usually governed by boards of directors appointed by
a mayor or another public official.
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federal mandates, although they do exercise some discretion to the
extent permitted by federal law. 103
Traditional public housing is distinguishable from so-called
"Section 8" or "voucher" housing. Section 8 housing is generally owned
and operated not by governmental entities but by private landlords,
and it is also governed by a different set of laws,1"4 although some
similar requirements apply to both programs. Traditional public
housing is also distinguishable from privatized public housing,
although many of the dignitary protections are equally applicable to
both. 105
Although public housing differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
and from site to site, national averages provide a sense of what poverty
in public housing looks like. Over two million people across the country
live in public housing,1 0 6 having an average household income of
$13,724107 and paying roughly 30% of their monthly adjusted income
towards rent. 0 8 Approximately seven of eight residents are elderly,
disabled, and/or responsible for small children.109 In 2005, the Urban
Institute found that 40% of residents at five public housing sites in
Chicago were "hard to house," meaning that their ability to find
103. For a discussion of the extent of federal control over public housing policy,
see Otto J. Hetzel, Asserted Federal Devolution of Public Housing Policy and
Administration: Myth or Reality, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 415 (2000).
104. Public housing is funded under Section 9 of the Act, codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1437g (2008), whereas Section 8 or voucher housing is funded under
Section 8, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2014). For further discussion
of what is popularly known as the "Section 8" or "voucher" program, see infra, Part
V.a.
105. There are some important differences in how dignitary rights operate in
privatized public housing, although these differences do not need to be discussed
for the purposes of this article. For a full discussion, see Jaime A. Lee, Rights at
Risk in Privatized Public Housing, 50 TULSA L. REV. 759 (2014) [hereinafter Lee,
Rights at Risk].
106. This number is derived from HUD administrative data from 2010,
adjusted to 2013. See Data Generator for Subsidized Housing, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous.
& URBAN DEV., http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/picture/
yearlydata.html#data-display-tab (for program tab, query "Public housing," and for
variable tab, select "Number of people: total"; then click "get results").
107. This number is derived from HUD administrative data from 2010,
adjusted to 2013. See Data Generator for Subsidized Housing, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous.
& URBAN DEV., http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/picture/
yearlydata.html#data-display-tab (for program tab, query "Public housing," and for
variable tab, select "Household income per year"; then click "get results").
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1437a(a)(1) (2014).
109. Policy Basics: Introduction to Public Housing, CENTER ON BUDGET AND
POLICY PRIORITIES (June 1, 2015), http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=2528.
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alternative shelter is severely limited because of income and other
factors, such as a lack of a high school degree or involvement with the
criminal justice system.1 1 ° Public housing residents also report a
"stunning" incidence of health problems, significantly above national
averages, which frequently turn daily living activities into
challenges.111 Even so, wages are a major source of income for 28% of
households,112 and only 12% depend on welfare as a major source of
income. 113
Despite the severe challenges they face, public housing
residents remain subject to culturalism's disdain. Residents have,
however, benefited to some extent from the counter-culturalist
protections established by the Court in the context of welfare.
i. Conditions
Public housing assistance, like welfare, has frequently been
conditioned on arbitrary moral standards offensive to notions of
privacy and free association. After the Supreme Court issued its
landmark conditions cases, it took some time for public housing
conditions to be excised by the courts-some policies deemed "galling"
by legal scholars in the late 1960sn 4 were not litigated until the
1980s-but courts did eventually strike policies requiring the
registration of overnight guests1 1 5  and denying benefits to
nontraditional families1 1 6 and unmarried parents.117 Legal challenges
110. MARY K. CUNNINGHAM, SUSAN J. POPK1N, & MARTHA R. BURT, PUBLIC
HOUSING TRANSFORMATION AND THE "HARD TO HOUSE" 3 (June 2005),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/311178-Public-
Housing-Transformation-and-the-quot-Hard-to-House-quot-.PDF (studying five
"distressed" sites in 2005 in Chicago); see also SUSAN J. POPKIN ET AL., A DECADE
OF HOPE VI: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY CHANGES 32-33 (May 2004),
http://www.urban.org(UploadedPDF/411002_HOPEVI.pdf.
111. See SUSAN J. POPKIN & LIZA GETSINGER, TACKLING THE BIGGEST
CHALLENGE (Dec. 18, 2014), http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/412257-Intensive-
Case-Management.pdf.
112. See Data Generator for Subsidized Housing, supra note 106.
113. See id.
114. See Reich, Undesirables, supra note 64, at 990.
115. See McKenna v. Peekskill Hous. Auth., 647 F.2d 332, 336 (2d Cir. 1981)
(holding that a "demand for prior permission, disclosure of names, and approval [of
overnight guests], was ... an overbroad defense against remote dangers which
could all have been combated in more direct and less intrusive ways").
116. See James v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 622 F. Supp. 1356, 1359-63 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (striking a ban on "newly formed" families).
117. See Hann v. Hous. Auth., 709 F. Supp. 605, 606 (E.D. Pa. 1989). Some local
policies now affirmatively embrace nontraditional families that "evidence a stable
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to conditions on public housing assistance are not always successful, 11s
but overall, public housing benefits today are much less likely to be
conditioned on the waiver of fundamental rights.
Of special note is that once-common restrictions on resident
speech are now subject to much greater scrutiny,119 which is not only
important for the residents' general freedom of expression, but has had
particularly important implications for residents' ability to organize,
mobilize,12 ° and engage in collective action to combat culturalism, as
discussed below in Part IV.
ii. Adjudications
Public housing fully adopted Goldberg's mandate of a pre-
termination evidentiary hearing. The Second Circuit applied Goldberg
to public housing in Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority,'21
brought by a class of residents challenging evictions for
"undesirability," among other things. Escalera held that the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids termination of benefits without
adequate notice of the charges, the right to cross-examine witnesses
and evidence, and other procedural safeguards.'2 2 Similarly, the
Fourth Circuit expressly extended Goldberg protections to public
housing terminations in a case involving a woman evicted because her
children allegedly committed immoral acts. 123
family relationship, regardless of marriage or blood ties," as well as teenage
mothers. Madeline Howard, Subsidized Housing Policy: Defining the Family,
22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 97, 103-04 (2007).
118. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002)
119. See generally Christopher D. Pelliccioni, Political Speech in the Nonpublic
Forum: Can Public Housing Facilities Limit Access to Political Canvassers?, 53
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 569 (2002) (discussing circuit split as to whether political
activists may be barred from public housing premises); U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. &
URBAN DEV., PIH-2012-32 (HA), Rental Assistance Demonstration-Final
Implementation, Revision 1, 93-98 (July 2, 2013), http://portal.hud.gov/
hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=pih20l2-32revl.pdf [hereinafter RAD Notice]
(protecting organizing activities in certain privatized public housing, including
canvassing, use of meeting space, and working with nonresident organizers).
120. Mobilization involves mounting collective action campaigns for the
purpose of gaining bargaining power. See, e.g., Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V.
Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 443
(2001) (describing how, like their union counterparts, "law and organizing
proponents seek to build collective bargaining power in order to create more
equitable working conditions").
121. Escalera v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970).
122. See id. at 862.
123. See Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970).
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Another Supreme Court case hastened the administrative
application of Goldberg to public housing nationwide. In Thorpe v.
Housing Authority, a resident was evicted after being elected president
of a resident organization. 124 Prior to Goldberg, the Court had already
ruled that the resident in Thorpe deserved notice of the reasons for her
eviction, as well as an opportunity to reply, and remanded.125 Before
Thorpe could go back to the U.S. Supreme Court on the First
Amendment claim, HUD issued administrative guidance requiring
pre-termination evidentiary hearings, then further refined this
guidance through negotiations with a group of housing agencies and
with legal advocates representing the interests of residents. 126 This
guidance was later codified by statute and incorporated into federal
regulations. 1
27
These procedures, called "grievance" procedures, mirror the
Goldberg standards. They provide first for an informal discussion,
through which landlord and resident can seek to resolve their
dispute.2 ' A resident can then request a more formal hearing,
adjudicated by an "impartial" person selected in accordance with a
process approved collectively by the residents,'29 at which a lawyer or
other representative may be present.'30 The resident may examine the
written rules that she allegedly violated, examine the landlord's
documents and witnesses against her, and present her own evidence in
rebuttal. Both informal and formal processes must be documented in
writing'3 1 and the formal hearing decision is binding on the landlord
and can be appealed in court. 1
2
124. Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of City of Durham, 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
125. See id.
126. See George Lefcoe, HUD's Authority to Mandate Tenants' Rights in Public
Housing, 80 YALE L.J. 463, 472-75 (1971).
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k), 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.50-966.57.
128. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.54; U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC Hous.
OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK 210 (June 2003), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
documents/huddoc?id=DOC_10760.pdf [hereinafter HUD, OCCUPANCY
GUIDEBOOK].
129. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-1(d)(6), (e) and (f) (requiring the
development of the grievance procedure in consultation with the resident advisory
board and the holding of an open meeting for review and comment on the
procedure); 24 C.F.R. § 966.55(b).
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k)(4).
131. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.54 (1984); 24 C.F.R. § 966.56(G) (1991); 42 U.S.C. §
1437d(k)(6) (1998); HUD, OCCUPANCY GUIDEBOOK, supra note 128.
132. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.57 (1984). All states also require a court
hearing prior to eviction. See The Eviction Process, EVICTION RESOURCES,
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These rights to understand and contest termination decisions
are a key part of Goldberg's legacy. In addition, Goldberg's protections
were extended in two important ways. In Joy v. Daniels, procedural
due process was held to apply not just when a lease is prematurely
terminated, but also when a lease expires.3 3 Thus, a public housing
lease must be renewed year after year, unless there is sufficient cause
to terminate benefits. This assures residents of shelter from year to
year and greatly increases their housing stability.1 34 The second
important extension of Goldberg is that grievance rights are mandated
not only in cases of termination, but in the event of nearly "any adverse
action" by the landlord,135 which means that a resident has the right to
grieve nearly any landlord action against her.
iii. Rulemaking
As noted briefly above, after Goldberg, the Court issued other
important procedural due process rulings. Among other things, the
Court set forth minimum requirements for rulemakings under the
Administrative Procedures Act. 136 The APA governs regulatory actions
by HUD and, consequently, national advocacy organizations frequently
participate in federal rulemaking procedures on behalf of residents.
The APA does not apply to the local agencies that own and operate the
housing, since they are not federal agencies but state
instrumentalities.3 7 Because these local agencies exert so much
control over the day-to-day lives of residents, however, federal law
requires them to follow APA-like notice-and-comment procedures, as
discussed below in Part IV.
http://www.evictionresources.com/eviction-process.html (last visited Dec. 18,
2014).
133. See Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1242 (4th Cir. 1973).
134. See Lee, Rights at Risk, supra note 105, at 778.
135. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k); 24 C.F.R. § 966.51(a)(2)(i) (2014). These rules echo
Escalera, which held that even the assessment of minor fines by a landlord against
a resident, such as a two-dollar fine for playing ball on the property, triggered some
level of procedural protection. Escalera v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 863
(2d Cir. 1970). Exceptions include circumstances where the health, safety, or right
to peaceful enjoyment of others is threatened and where there is violent or drug-
related criminal activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k); 24 C.F.R. § 966.51(a)(2)(i)
(2014).
136. See Administrative Procedure Act § 10a, 5 U.S.C. 1009.
137. 5 U.S.C. § 701 (West 2011) (specifying that "the governments of the
territories" are not within the scope of the APA).
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c. Culturalist Challenges to Procedure
The protections derived from the Court's rulings have benefits,
but provide deeply inadequate protection against culturalism. The
procedural rulings proved especially unsatisfying to those who had
hoped the Court would go much farther and establish a substantive,
constitutional right to welfare benefits. At times, the Court hinted that
such a right might exist;138 Goldberg, for example, emphasized that
welfare benefits in and of themselves were fundamental to dignity,
equality, and liberty as contemplated by the Constitution. 139 Yet the
Court never established substantive constitutional rights to a
minimum income, jobs, safety, or freedom from prejudice based on lack
of income,140 instead merely establishing formalistic procedural
protections. 141 In doing so, the Court might be said to have sided with
culturalism's denial of governmental responsibility for alleviating
poverty. Consequently, due process jurisprudence has been critiqued
as "empty formalism, bereft of the moral guidance needed to bring
about justice in our society."14 2
As it turned out, even the formalistic procedural protections
the Court did provide were retractable. In Board of Regents v. Roth,14 1
the Court explained its rationale for applying constitutional standards
in Goldberg, unnecessary in Goldberg itself because it was conceded
138. See Laurence H. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1065, 1080 (1977) (discussing Shapiro v. Thompson and other cases as
suggesting minimal entitlements to services such as health, housing, and
employment); Lucie White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990); Bennett, No Relief,
supra note 51, at 2183.
139. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254; see also MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE
UNDESERVING POOR 180-83 (1989) (discussing dignitary rationales for welfare).
140. See Joel F. Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle" The
Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare
History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 900 (1990); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process
Counterrevolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1981 (1996) (describing a
"partial retreat and consolidation" from 1973 to 1978); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two
Wrongs Don't Add Up to Rights: The Importance of Preserving Due Process in Light
of Recent Welfare Reform Measures, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1111, 1121-22 (1996)
[hereinafter Zietlow, Two Wrongs]; Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
(rejecting a Constitutional right to income).
141. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Government Benefits and
the Rule of Law: Toward a Standards-Based Theory of Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L.
REV. 107, 110-19 (2005); Merrill, supra note 89, at 892.
142. Zietlow, Giving Substance, at 26 et seq.
143. 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (holding that an untenured professor did not hold
a property right in or "entitlement" to his employment at a state university).
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there that due process applied. But in Roth, the Court expounded on
what kind of property rights warranted constitutional due process, 
144
explaining that
[p]roperty rights, of course, are not created by the
Constitution. Rather they are created .. . by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law-rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlement to those benefits. Thus,
the welfare recipients in [Goldberg] had a claim of
entitlement to welfare payments that was grounded in
the statute defining eligibility for them. 145
In what is known as the "positivist trap," 146 Roth held that
constitutionally-protected property rights exist only if the underlying
law creates such rights. 147 In other words, Roth can be interpreted to
allow lawmakers to determine whether due process is mandated,
without regard to constitutional principles. 148 Scholars alarmed by the
implications of the positivist trap were proven right when Congress
statutorily declared an end to entitlement status of welfare in the mid-
1990s.1 49 Consequently, Goldberg protections no longer apply.
Entitlement status has not been legislatively retracted in the
public housing context, so Goldberg's pre-termination evidentiary
hearings remain mandatory. But these procedures, too, have proven to
be highly vulnerable to culturalism. For the hearings to be effective, a
hearing officer must fairly consider the matter before her without
prejudice or predisposition toward either side, and for this reason, a
hearing officer is required to be "impartial."1 50 Impartiality is highly
unlikely, however, in a society permeated by culturalism. It is even less
likely given that employees of the landlord are permitted to adjudicate
the procedures as long as they are not personally involved in the
144. Merrill, supra note 89, at 918 (describing Roth as "best understood as an
effort to secure the legitimacy of the due process revolution started by Goldberg").
145. See Roth 408 U.S. 577.
146. Merrill, supra note 89, at 920.
147. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 87, at 110-19; Jerry L. Mashaw,
Administrative Due Process: The Quest for a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885,
888 (1981); Zietlow, Giving Substance, supra note 85, at 28; Merrill, supra note 89,
at 892; see also David A. Super, The Political Economy of Entitlement, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 633, 635 (2004) (identifying and analyzing at least six different notions of
"entitlement").
148. Zietlow, Giving Substance, supra note 85, at n.135.
149. See generally id.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(k)(2), 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.55(b).
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dispute.1 5 1 Hearing officers need not be lawyers, nor must they be
trained to address the power imbalances inherent in a dispute where
one side controls the other's access to shelter.15 2 Furthermore, while
grievances are technically appealable, federal oversight of grievance
procedures is nominal,1 53 judicial enforcement is often inaccessible to
the poor,55 and at any rate, both administrative and judicial
procedures are often similarly permeated by culturalism.155 In short,
very little prevents culturalist bias from undermining the effectiveness
of grievance processes.
d. The Persistence of Culturalism
Culturalism still thrives in aid programs today. It expresses
itself in both welfare and public housing in the form of substandard
aid, which is a well-documented culturalist strategy for discouraging
dependency.1 56 Of the many troubles that have plagued public
housing-corrupt and inept management, a shrinking supply of units,
maintenance failures that strand elderly and disabled residents
151. See 24 C.F.R. § 966.55(b)(1) (2015).
152. See White, supra note 138. Similar concerns are present in other forms of
alternative dispute resolution. See, e.g., Mindy D. Rufenacht, The Concern Over
Confidentiality in Mediation: An In-Depth Look at the Protection Provided by the
Proposed Uniform Mediation Act, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 113, 114; Protecting
Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1984). For a social work
perspective on reforming Goldberg procedures to address the inherent
disadvantages experienced by welfare recipients, see Vicki Lens, Revisiting the
Promise of Kelly v. Goldberg in the Era of Welfare Reform, 21 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POLLY 43 (2013).
153. Administrative and judicial enforcement of residents' participation rights
is all but non-existent. Lee, Rights at Risk, supra note 105.
154. See, e.g., David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System,
64 BROOK. L. REV. 231, 233 (1998) (privatization and technology reduce due process
rights of welfare recipients); Zietlow, Giving Substance, supra note 85 (limitations
on class action lawsuits and on the ability of the poor to secure effective legal
representation have effectively undermined the intent of the due process
revolution).
155. Even in formal court proceedings, where procedural protections against
bias and unfair proceedings are significantly greater than in grievance procedures,
poor, self-represented tenants struggle to attain fair outcomes. See Barbara Bezdek,
Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in
Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992); Michael Zmora, Note & Comment,
Between Rucker and a Hard Place: The Due Process Void for Section 8 Voucher
Holders in No-Fault Evictions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1961, 1986 (2009).
156. See FRANCES Fox P1VEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR:
THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (2d ed. 1993) (explaining that public aid is
calculated to provide less than the minimum one could earn through paid work).
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without elevators for days,"7 and neglect and crime that make
buildings all but uninhabitable 158-most are attributable, in
significant part, to inadequate Congressional funding, which is a tool
for discouraging dependency by making sure that public housing is not
too comfortable. 
15 9
Present-day welfare programs, for example, may require a
woman to assist with a court action to establish paternity of her child,
which constitutes a state-led inquiry into her intimate relations and
forces a mother and her child to form legal, familial, and economic ties
to the father, whether or not they wish to associate with him. 160 Some
states refuse additional benefits for children born after a woman
enrolls in a welfare program,'61 constraining her choices to create a
family and to engage in sexual activity, especially in areas where
reproductive planning services are costly or inaccessible. Simply
participating in the welfare program can trigger drug testing1 62 and
heightened scrutiny from the criminal justice system. 163 People who
use food stamps to buy alcohol or tobacco may have their benefits
terminated, be fined thousands of dollars, or be imprisoned. " A recent
157. See Nicole Schmidt, San Francisco Public Housing as an Avenue for
Empowerment: The Case for Spirited Compliance With Tenant Participation
Requirements, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L. J. 333, 344-45 (2009) (describing
collapsed stairwells, failed plumbing, boarded windows, and sewage water leaking
into an apartment, as reported by the San Francisco Chronicle in 2007 and 2008).
158. See generally Julia Clayton Powell, Comment, De Facto Demolition: The
Hidden Deterioration of Public Housing, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 885, 888 (1995) (citing
to cases of "de facto" demolition due to failure to keep units in a habitable condition
or respond to tenants' repair requests as well as the presence of drug dealing); see
also Michael H. Schill, Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The
Case of Public Housing, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 877, 897 (1990); SUDHIR ALLADI
VENKATESH, AMERICAN PROJECT: THE RISE AND FALL OF A MODERN GHETTO 112
(2000) (reporting that by 1982, "[m]aintenance in public housing had lapsed [and]
millions of dollars were needed for modernization.").
159. See Cara Hendrickson, Racial Desegregation and Income Deconcentration
in Public Housing, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 35, 55-56 (2002).
160. See Zietlow, Two Wrongs, supra note 140, at 1131.
161. See Jennifer Kendrex, Punishing the Poor Through Welfare Reform: Cruel
and Unusual?, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 121 (2015).
162. See Bach, Hyperregulatory State, supra note 16, at 340-41.
163. See id. at 334, 357-66.
164. See Restrictions on Use of Public Assistance Electronic Benefit Transfer
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proposal seeks to ban the use of food stamps to buy cookies, chips,
energy drinks, and steak. 15
Morality controls also remain part of life in public housing
today so that benefits may be denied to the unworthy. In 2002, the
Supreme Court in Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker held that an
entire household may be evicted because one household member or
guest engaged in criminal activity, 166 meaning that one can lose shelter
for failing to control one's children. Applicants must undergo alcohol
and drug screening and may be refused admission for having a
criminal record,1 67 and current residents may also be subject to drug
testing168 and cannot be readmitted for at least three years after a
drug-related eviction. 169 Most residents must work, perform
community service, or participate in a self-sufficiency program to
retain their benefits.170 Today, some of these rules have become
165. See H. R. 813, 98th Gen. Assemb. 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015),
http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/billsl5l1billpdf/intro/HB0813I.PDF.
166. See Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 130-131 (2002); see also Caroline Castle, Note,
You Call That a Strike? A Post-Rucker Examination of Eviction From Public
Housing Due to Drug-Related Criminal Activity of a Third Party, 37 GA. L. REV.
1435 (2003); Regina Austin, "Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother's Back": Poor
Moms, Myths of Authority, and Drug-Related Evictions From Public Housing,
14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 273, 275 (2002); Margaret E. Finzen, Note, Systems of
Oppression: The Collateral Consequences of Incarceration and Their Effects on
Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLY 299, 313-14 (2005); Lisa
Weil, Note, Drug-Related Evictions in Public Housing: Congress' Addiction to a
Quick Fix, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 161, 171 (1991); Michelle Ewert, One Strike and
You're Out of Public Housing: How the Intersection of the War on Drugs and Federal
Housing Policy Violates Due Process and Fair Housing Principles, HARV. J. RACIAL
& ETHNIC JUSTICE (forthcoming 2016); see also Sarah Swan, Home Rules, 64 DUKE
L.J. 823, 825-27 (2015) (discussing the expansion of one-strike policies).
167. Act of Oct. 21, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-276, § 575-577, 112 Stat. 2461, 2633
(1998).
168. There is no federal policy either permitting or prohibiting resident testing,
although some local agencies do impose testing. See Marah Curtis et al., Alcohol,
Drug, and Criminal History Restrictions in Public Housing, 15 CITYSCAPE: J. OF
POLY DEV. & RES., no. 3, 2013, at 37, 39.
169. Ctanston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625
§ 501, 104 Stat. 4079, 4181.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(j); 24 C.F.R. 960.600-960.609. Some agencies have HUD
permission to impose especially stringent work requirements. See, e.g., Jennifer
Levitz, Public Housing Agencies Push to Impose Time Limits,
Work Requirements for Recipients, WALL ST. J. (May 6, 2013, 11:00pm)
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424127887323820304578410382522144560.
Under the Moving to Work program, 39 public housing agencies may request HUD
permission to deviate from standard requirements. See History of Moving to Work
(MTW), U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV, http://portal.hud.gov/
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normalized through familiarity, but their invasiveness is more
apparent when viewed as a matter of inequality. It is hard to imagine
the state requiring a paternity test or drug test from those who claim
the mortgage interest tax deduction, or rescinding that financial
benefit if the household has a child who uses drugs.
Privatization has further expanded the list of behavioral
controls placed on the poor and used to deny access to benefits. Private-
sector landlords often employ stricter standards17 ' to "cream" those
applicants from the waiting list who they believe are more desirable,
while denying admission to others, even though they are equally
eligible for benefits. People with poor credit and rent payment
histories, for example, may be rejected under tighter screening
standards imposed by private landlords, thus denying benefits to the
poor simply because they have a history of being poor. Stricter
screening standards may also be used to reject those suffering from
mental health challenges or who otherwise might demand additional
resources from landlords, but who are in need of housing and eligible
for benefits. Privatized public housing also often extends behavioral
controls on the poor by imposing extensive "house rules" banning
routine daily activities like playing on the grass, washing or socializing
near cars, 172 bike-riding, or holding social gatherings in public.
1 73
Serious and repeated violations of such rules can potentially lead to
eviction,174 and since local agencies and owners of privatized public
housing have discretion as to the scope and administration of some of
these rules, behavioral controls are applied inconsistently across the
hudportallHUD?src=/program.offices/publiclindianhousing/programs/ph/mtw/hi
story (last visited Oct. 30, 2015).
171. Academic Perspectives on the Future of Public Housing: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong.
117 (July 29, 2009) (statement of Edward G. Goetz, Dir. of Ctr. For Urban & Reg'l
Affairs, Univ. of Minn.); see also Jesse Kropf, Keeping "Them" Out: Criminal Record
Screening, Public Housing, and the Fight Against Racial Caste, 4 CEO. J.L. & MOD.
CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 75, 78 (2012) (discussing local agencies' screening out of
people who have been arrested, but not convicted, for minor crimes); William C.
Nussbaum, Public Housing: Choosing Among Families in Need of Housing, 77 NW.
U. L. REV. 700, 702-03 (1982).
172. See Terry A.C. Gray, De-Concentrating Poverty and Promoting Mixed-
Income Communities in Public Housing: The Quality Housing and Work
Responsibility Act of 1998, 11 STAN. L. & POLy REV. 173, 181 (1999).
173. DEP'T. OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV., Mixed Income Community Dynamics:
Five Insights From Ethnography, EVIDENCE MATTERS (Spring 2013).
174. A lease may be terminated for "serious or repeated violation of material
terms of the lease," which usually incorporate behavioral house rules, or for "other
good cause." See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(l)(1)(5) (1974); 24 C.F.R. §§ 966.4(f)(l)-(2) (2010).
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Despite the lack of effective protections against culturalism-
or perhaps because of it-residents have continued to press for greater
dignitary rights. Resident-driven mobilization, litigation, and law
reform efforts have generated some profound changes. To name just a
few instances, thousands of St. Louis residents staged prolonged
strikes against rising rents and agency mismanagement in the late
1960s, resulting in rent caps and new federal funding streams that
preserved affordability for the very poor. 176 Class action race
discrimination suits brought in cities like Chicago and Baltimore
177
resulted in large-scale desegregation programs that paved the way for
mobility programs.1 8 San Francisco residents waged a multi-year
campaign against a redevelopment initiative in the 1990s, holding
high-profile protests, going door-to-door to recruit resident activists,
and refusing to relocate until the local agency made certain
concessions; over 60% of residents reportedly participated in these
activities, resulting in significantly fewer people being forcibly
displaced.17 9 From 2013 to 2014, Seattle residents picketed, held
demonstrations, made media appearances, and built alliances with
175. See Curtis et al., supra note 168.
176. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Does America Need Public Housing?, 19 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 689, 695-96 (2012).
177. Florence Roisman refers to litigation brought in these and other cities:
Texarkana, Arkansas; East Texas; Dallas; Commerce, Texas; Galveston, Texas;
Buffalo, New York; Omaha, Nebraska; Minneapolis, Minnesotta; New Haven,
Connecticut; and Allegheny County (Pittsburgh), Pennsylvania. See Florence
Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in Regional Housing
Markets: The Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 333, 343-46 (2007) [hereinafter Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair
Housing].
178. See infra Part V.
179. See James Tracy, Hope VI Mixed-Income Housing Projects Displace Poor
People, RACE, POVERTY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Spring 2008)
http://reimaginerpe.org/node/1811.
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community groups and city council members'80 to prevent a dramatic
rise in rents. 181
Countless other examples exist.182 While not all such efforts
result in change, public housing has been altered by grassroots
activism, bolstered by rights to notice-and-comment and rights to
organize, and by support from community organizers and legal and
policy advocates at both the local and national levels.
When local advocacy leads to dignitary protections being
implemented at a particular housing site, those protections are
sometimes later incorporated into federal law and made broadly
applicable to public housing nationwide via statute, regulations, and/or
sub-regulatory materials. Some of the innovations described below, for
example, were derived from resident activism in St. Louis or Chicago.
These innovations are hard-won gains, yet they do not always produce
real benefits. As dignitary rights developed in one city are rendered
into generally applicable law, then put into practice at other sites, the
power to protect dignity often gets lost. Among the reasons for this loss
is that the original intent of these laws is often undermined by
culturalism.
Dignity initiatives are categorized into two groups as described
below. Mechanisms of "voice" offer residents extended rights of self-
expression only, while mechanisms of "choice" provide residents with a
significant degree of decisional power.
a. Dignity Through Voice
The exercise of "voice" can be defined as a resident's
engagement with her landlord through channels of communication
protected by law for the purpose of participating in the control and
governance of her housing. Mechanisms of voice in public housing echo
180. See Steve Leigh, A Public Housing Victory In Seattle, SOCIALIST WORKER
(Jan. 5, 2015), http://socialistworker.org2015/01/05/public-housing-victory-in-
seattle; Danielle Palmer-Friedman, "Stepping Forward" Takes a Step Back, DAILY
OF UNIV. OF WASH. (Dec. 23, 2014, 12:00 am), http://www.dailyuw.comlnewsf
article_4a9c4bOd-5c68-5aaO-9737-22494e88f05d.html.
181. See Major Victory: Tenant Movements Puts Brakes on the Seattle Housing
Authority "Stepping Forward" Rent Hike, SHA TENANTS ORG. PROJECT (Dec. 22,
2014), https://stopsha.wordpress.com/2014/12/22/major-victory-tenant-movement-
puts-brakes-on-seattle-housing-authority-stepping-forward-rent-hike/.
182. Litigation in the context of welfare also resulted in consent decrees aimed
at extending dignitary protections for applicants. See Bennett, No Relief, supra note
55, at 2204-09.
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the principles reflected in the Court's due process rulings, 183 but extend
well beyond the Court's mandates.
i. Representative Bodies
In the 1990s, numerous channels were established for
residents to offer their input to local agency officials concerning
housing policy and activities. At least one eligible resident must have
a seat on the governing board of the local agency, 1 8 4 and she "must be
allowed to take part in the administration, operations, and
management of public housing."18 5 Residents are also entitled to speak
collectively through at least three formally recognized organizations.
The Resident Advisory Board (RAB), whose members must
"adequately reflect and represent" the entire community,186 is the
official resident respondent for notice-and-comment procedures,1 8 7 as
discussed below. Local agencies "must consider" RAB
recommendations 188 and also must report to HUD on how it addressed
those recommendations. 189
A second organization that must be "recognized" by local
agencies has broad powers with respect to a particular housing
complex. The role of the Resident Council'90 is to "advise and assist in
all aspects of ... operations"191 with respect to a specific site. The
agency must "ensure strong participation" and "work in partnership"
with the Council through "regularly scheduled meetings."192
Significantly, Resident Councils also receive federal funding for
education, training, and other activities supporting resident
involvement in the governance of their housing.'91 If an established
183. See Bennett, No Relief, supra note 55, at 2184 ("Of all the beliefs Goldberg
v. Kelly expresses, the one that has resonated loudest and farthest is that justice
for the welfare recipient depends on protection of her power to engage the dispenser
of benefits-and to dictate the terms of that engagement.").
184. See 24 C.F.R. § 964.415(a).
185. 24 C.F.R. § 964.430. There are some exceptions to this rule, see
§ 964.430(a)(2)(i) and (ii), and exceptions described in this section exist for small
agencies that do not manage significant numbers of units, see 24 C.F.R. § 964.425.
186. 24 C.F.R. § 903.13(a).
187. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-1(e).
188. 24 C.F.R. § 905.300(b)(4).
189. See id.; see also 24 C.F.R. § 903.13.
190. See 24 C.F.R. § 964.105.
191. 24 C.F.R. § 964.100.
192. 24 C.F.R. § 964.105.
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437g(e)(1)(E) and (h)(1); see also 24 C.F.R. § 990.108(e)
and § 964.150.
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organization does not exist, then funding is applied to support
organizing activities; affirmative protections for organizing even exist
in some privatized public housing, which specify permitted activities
as including canvassing, use of meeting space, and working with
nonresident organizers.'9 4
A third organization, the jurisdiction-wide Resident Council,
has certain powers with respect to all of an agency's housing sites. It is
"recognize[d] as the voice of authority-wide residents for input into
[agency] policy-making"9 5 and is comprised either of the presidents of
the site-specific Resident Councils, or of people elected either by all
Resident Councils or by all residents at all sites. 
196
ii. Local Notice-and-Comment
Voice is also exercised through mandatory local notice-and-
comment processes. As noted, the Supreme Court's rulemaking
decisions govern the Administrative Procedure Act, 97 which does not
apply to local agencies. However, Congress requires that local agencies
comply with notice-and-comment procedures similar to those required
under the APA.' 98 Resident advocacy has helped expand what kinds of
agency actions are subject to these procedures, providing broader
rights to information and input about the decisions that affect their
lives.
Local notice-and-comment procedures require the publication
of materials in advance of a public hearing. The procedures are
triggered annually, when each agency announces its plans for the
upcoming year'99 and proposes changes to operational policies, such as
lease requirements, maintenance obligations, rent rates, eligibility
standards for new admittees, waiting list and unit transfer policies,
and house rules.2 00 These changes are of crucial interest to residents as
they govern, among other things, the cost of their housing and the
circumstances under which they can be evicted.
194. See RAD Notice, supra note 119, at 93-98.
195. 24 C.F.R. § 964.105(a).
196. 24 C.F.R. § 964.105(a).
197. See infra Part III.b.iii.
198. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(b)(2); 24 C.F.R. § 970.4(a); 24 C.F.R. § 970.8(e).
199. See 24 C.F.R. § 903 (2015); 24 C.F.R. § 905 (2015).
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437c-1(e).
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Local notice-and-comment is also triggered whenever an
agency plans to redevelop,20 1 demolish,0 2 or privatize public housing.20 3
These plans have a severe impact on residents, forcing them to relocate
on a schedule that is outside of their control. Being ejected from home,
losing ties with neighbors, having daily routines of work or school
disrupted, and needing to re-establish relationships with schools,
transportation networks, and medical services are extremely
challenging life events, especially for those with children or who are
elderly, disabled, or ill. Finding a replacement unit itself can be
difficult, especially when other relocatees are simultaneously seeking
new units. Additionally, this search is particularly difficult for those
with special physical needs, larger families, weak credit histories, no
funds for a security deposit, or police records,2"4 as they face particular
hardship in securing alternative housing. While federal law provides
financial and other assistance in cases of forced relocation, compliance
can be spotty and the relocation process can be difficult, chaotic, and
poorly managed.
205
Thus, the right to notice-and-comment can be critical to
residents' well-being. At a minimum, they enable residents to gain
advance knowledge of what their future holds, object to agency plans,
and demand additional information and support.
201. See 24 C.F.R. § 903 (2015); 24 C.F.R. Part 905; NOTICE PIH 2012-7 (HA)
(Feb. 2, 2012) (explaining that notice-and-comment for redevelopment is triggered
under the Annual Plan requirements).
202. See United States Housing Act of 1937, § 18, 50 Stat. 888 (1937); 24 U.S.C.
§ 570; 24 C.F.R. § 970 (2015); see also Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 79 F.R. 200
(Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-10-16/pdf/2014-24068.pdf;
Marvin Krislov, Ensuring Tenant Consultation Before Public Housing Is
Demolished or Sold, 97 YALE L.J. 1745 (1988).
203. See, e.g., RAD Notice, supra note 119, at 29, § 1.6B.3 & n.22.
204. For discussions of the general private-sector practice of "blacklisting" any
tenant named as a defendant in an unlawful detainer action, see Gary Williams,
Can Government Limit Tenant Blacklisting?, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 1077 (1995), and
Rudy Kleysteuber, Tenant Screening Thirty Years Later: A Statutory Proposal to
Protect Public Records, 116 YALE L.J. 1344 (2007).
205. At Chicago HOPE VI sites, for example, the local agency failed to track
thousands of residents during the relocation process. See Where Did Relocated
Public Housing Tenants Go? CHA Report Details, CHI. SUN TIMES, Apr. 15, 2011,
http://madamenoire.com/109347/where-did-relocated-public-housing-tenants-go-
cha-report-detalls/; When Hope Falls Short: Hope V, Accountability, and the
Privatization of Public Housing, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1497 (2003) (stating that
Chicago Housing Authority started tracking residents only three years after the
grant was awarded).
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iii. Beyond Notice-and-Comment
Beyond traditional notice-and-comment, residents sometimes
enjoy other rights to engage with agency officials concerning major
redevelopment or privatization projects. Through activism and class
action lawsuits, residents in Chicago agitated for extensive
participation rights with respect to redevelopment plans. 206 The court
settlement required the agency and the residents to agree on all
aspects of the redevelopment and permitted residents to petition the
court for a hearing if agreement was not reached. 2o7 HUD incorporated
some similar, though much weaker, consultation rights into rules
applicable to redevelopment projects being undertaken across the
nation.
Consultation rights in the HOPE VI redevelopment program
illustrate these types of rights. The HOPE VI program, started in 1993,
required agencies to apply for federal grants through a competitive
process.20 8 At times, HUD awarded applicants more points for
consulting with residents when designing and implementing
redevelopment projects. In the early years, requirements were
relatively robust. Agencies had to demonstrate that they had
"consulted" and "involved" residents in determining both the scope and
type of redevelopment, and that they "gave full consideration" to
residents' perspectives.2 9 Residents assisted with defining many key
issues: problems to be addressed through redevelopment, how to
address them, which units should be demolished and which should not,
the supportive services to be provided, the empowerment opportunities
to be made available to residents, and issues regarding the design of
the new housing project.
21
As the program grew and expanded, consultation rights
quickly diminished, although HUD occasionally showed interest in
206. See Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance:
Lessons from Chicago's Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY
L. & POL'Y 117, 165-71 (2009) (describing activism and litigation in Chicago in the
early and mid-1990s that led to broader resident participation rights).
207. See William P. Wilen, The Horner Model: Successfully Redeveloping Public
Housing, 1 NW. J. L. & SOC. POLY 62, 77 (2006) (providing the real estate
developer's account of the successful redevelopment process, emphasizing the
residents' enforceable participation rights, and comparing them to the weaker
protections available at other Chicago sites).
208. See DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., NOTICE OF HUD'S FISCAL YEAR
(FY) 1993 NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY (NOFA) (1993).
209. DEP'T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., NOTICE OF HUD'S FISCAL YEAR (FY)
2010 NOTICE OF FUNDING AVAILABILITY (NOFA) (2010), at 9.
210. See id.
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extending resident voice. For example, HUD sometimes awarded more
points to agencies that created local community task forces with
extensive consultation rights2" and that affirmatively incorporated
resident input into plans212 or otherwise proved that they adequately
addressed resident concerns.213 Such requirements were unusual,
however, and by 2002, consultation meant merely "providing
information"214 rather than collective project design and problem-
solving.
iv. Culturalist Challenges to Voice
The exercise of voice can have tangible benefits. For example,
consultation in Rhode Island, residents secured Spanish interpretation
and translation services to be employed in the notice-and-comment
process so that all residents could engage in housing decisions,
including a plan to demolish their housing.215 But in these cases and
others, changes did not flow merely from official mechanisms of voice
alone. Voice appears to be most effective only when combined with
forms of advocacy outside of officially-sanctioned channels of
communication, such as mobilization or lawsuits.
21 6
One reason for this is that voice provides only the opportunity
to offer input, and does not assure residents any influence, control, or
211. See DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., PUBLIC HOUSING DEMOLITION, SITE
REVITALIZATION, AND REPLACEMENT HOUSING GRANTS: HOPE VI REVITALIZATION
GRANT AGREEMENT REVISION (FY 1999) 15 (describing the grantee's obligation to
convene a community task force).
212. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Notice of HUD's Fiscal Year (FY) 1999
Notice of Funding Availability for Revitalization of Severely Distressed Public
Housing (Hope VI Revitalization), 63 Fed. Reg. 15577 (Mar. 31, 1998).
213. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Super Notice of Funding Availability
(SuperNOFA) for HUD's Housing, Community Development and Empowerment
Programs and Section 8 Housing Voucher Assistance for Fiscal Year 2002, 65 Fed.
Reg. 9322, 9323 (Feb. 24, 2000).
214. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Super Notice of Funding Availability
(SuperNOFA) for HUD's Discretionary Grant Programs for Fiscal Year 2002, 67
Fed. Reg. 13826, 13956 (2002).
215. See Heather Freinkel, HUD Determines 180 Public Housing Units
Ineligible for Demolition, 41 HOUSING LAW BULLETIN 11 (October 2011),
http://nhlp.org/files/Woonsocket%20Article.pdf (reporting that HUD declined to
immediately approve a 2010 demolition request by the Woonsocket Housing
Authority because of resident concerns about both inadequate consultation and
Fair Housing Act compliance).
216. See id.; Alexander, supra note 206, at 174, 178-80 (arguing for dialogic or
participatory mechanisms to be combined with traditional mechanisms such as
judicial intervention and administrative appeals, and proposing such a framework
in the HOPE VI context).
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decisional power over outcomes. For example, a resident may sit on the
board of the housing agency and hold voting power equal to that of
other board members, but cannot unilaterally change the outcome of a
board vote. Requirements that residents be "consulted" or "involved,"
and that they be permitted to "participate," "advise," "counsel," and
"provide recommendations" that are to be afforded "full consideration,"
similarly withhold decisional power. Mechanisms of voice are thus
purely procedural and offer residents no guarantee that their input will
change the status quo.
As mechanisms of voice do not afford residents decisional
power, voice is highly susceptible to being undermined by culturalism.
Residents who are discredited and stigmatized for their poverty have
little chance of effectively negotiating with agency officials or
developers who retain all of the formal decision-making power. In
addition, the agency controls access to shelter, exponentially deepening
this power imbalance and chilling engagement by residents.
The subversive effects of power imbalances on dialogic
processes 17 have been explored by scholars focused on the ability of
less powerful groups to engage in participatory governance systems.
Joel Handler suggests that for dependent people to meaningfully
engage in discussions with the state, power must first be redistributed
by dedicating resources to the group and by structuring negotiations to
create the potential for material benefits to be gained by both sides.21
Another approach suggests that for dialogic processes to succeed, each
side's contribution to a common goal must be recognized and supported
through power-shifting mechanisms.21 9 Under such theories, residents
can only have meaningful voice if they gain resources or bargaining
power. If residents do not have power to overcome culturalist
disregard, mechanisms of voice will almost certainly fail to produce
meaningful benefits.
Culturalism's hallmarks of control and subordination are
woven into the mechanisms of voice themselves. For instance, resident
217. See Wendy A. Bach, Governance, Accountability, and the New Poverty
Agenda, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 239, 267 (2010); Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform,
Privatization, and Power: Reconfiguring Administrative Law Structures from the
Ground Up, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 317-18 (2009).
218. See JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY 9, 20-21,
ch. 7 (1990); JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF
PRIVATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT, ch. 6 (1996).
219. See, e.g., Jaime A. Lee, "Can You Hear Me Now?". Making Participatory
Governance Work for the Poor, 7 HARV. L. & POLY REV. 405,407 (2013) [hereinafter
Lee, Can You Hear Me Now].
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input must be channeled through prescribed outlets in order to be
recognized. Residents are required to speak through organizational
bodies and with a unified voice, regardless of the diversity of
perspectives that may exist. In some cases, agency officials may choose
who represents the residents,20 making voice subject to government
manipulation. If multiple organizations exist, the agency may decide
which receive funding and which do not.22'
Evidence from the field suggests some of the challenges faced
by residents in influencing outcomes through deliberative processes.
Accounts of engagement in participatory systems reflect significant
anger, frustration, fear, and distrust on the part of residents.222 One
report described a resident organization meeting in San Francisco run
entirely by agency officials who may have intimidated activist
residents from participating while also downplaying resident
testimony in the meeting notes.223 Another study found that some
nonresidents viewed the point of resident participation not as engaging
in dialogue, but merely as sharing information and teaching residents
how to be "less confrontational."
224
By suppressing or discrediting voice, culturalism can severely
undermine or even nullify the value of voice.225 The ineffectiveness of
voice may help explain why public housing residents often opt out of
these systems.226 Field observations also suggest that residents may
220. See 24 C.F.R. § 964.400-30 (2014) (permitting but not requiring resident
control over the choice of board of directors representative); 24 C.F.R. § 903.13
(2014) (requiring the Resident Advisory Board to be comprised of certain
representatives elected by residents, but also permitting the agency to designate
representatives).
221. See 24 C.F.R. § 964.150 (2014).
222. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 206, at 174-75; Georgette C. Poindexter,
Who Gets the Final No?, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 659 (2000); Schmidt, supra
note 157, at 333.
223. See Schmidt, supra note 157, at 347-48.
224. Mark L. Joseph & Robert J. Chaskin, Mixed-Income Developments and
Low Rates of Return: Insights From Relocated Public Housing
Residents in Chicago, 22 HOUSING POLY DEBATE 377, 394-96 (2012),
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10511482.2012.680479.
225. Administrative and judicial enforcement of residents' participation rights
are all but non-existent. See Lee, Rights at Risk, supra note 105, at 786.
226. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Public Housing Evaluation and
Oversight: Changes to the Public Housing Assessment System (PHAS) and
Determining and Remedying Substantial Default, 73 Fed. Reg. 49544-01 (proposing
the elimination of the resident services and satisfaction indicator and temporarily
suspending its use because it "has not yielded the degree of feedback that HUD
hoped to obtain from this indicator"); Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Public Housing
Evaluation and Oversight: Changes to the Public Housing Assessment System
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not participate because they fear landlord retaliation,22 7 are deterred
by other burdens of participation, and may have concerns about co-
optation, acquiescence, or domination by representatives.228 But when
residents choose not to engage, culturalists may view this as
affirmation that the poor lack the motivation to improve their
situations, arguing that if the poor do not take opportunities to engage,
the government has no obligation to address their interests.
Alternatively, if residents choose to engage in ways outside of formally
sanctioned channels of voice, culturalism may argue that they are not
abiding by the rules of engagement, yet again justifying
nonresponsiveness on the part of the government.
b. Dignity Through Choice: Resident Management
In contrast to voice, mechanisms of "choice" offer residents
significant decisional power and autonomy. A degree of control or
autonomy is viewed as fundamental to dignity,22 9 and its significance
is especially apparent in the public housing context, where residents
have little control over their living environment.
In recent decades, federal law has supported resident
autonomy primarily through two sets of initiatives. The section below
explores the first set of programs, which supported residents in taking
control over the day-to-day management of their housing. While this
type of activity no longer takes place, its history provides lessons for
the future. The other type of choice enables residents to exercise more
choice over where they live through "mobility" programs and is
discussed extensively in Part V.
(PHAS) and Determining and Remedying Substantial Default, 76 Fed. Reg. 10147
(eliminating the survey in the interim rule because it "does not have a sufficient
completion rate overall to be useful").
227. See Schmidt, supra note 157, at 336.
228. See Scott L. Cummings, Mobilization Lawyering: Community Economic
Development in the Figueroa Corridor, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
302, 303 (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds. 2006) (arguing that collaborative
negotiation models may lead to quiescence); JOEL F. HANDLER, LAW AND THE
SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY, 21-28 (1998) [hereinafter Handler, Law and
Community]; Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance:
Lessons From Chicago's Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POLY 117, 163-64 (2009) (reporting Chicago residents' suspicions of
representative acquiescence and cooptation); Poindexter, supra note 222, at 667
(describing dominant leadership by one resident in a participatory process in
Atlanta).
229. See supra, note 45.
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1. Experiments
Public housing management duties are usually delegated to
local agency staff who handle daily operations like rent collection,
maintenance, evictions, developing and administering house rules, and
other matters where federal law permits local housing agencies to
exercise discretion. Experiments in transferring some management
duties to residents began at around the time of the due process
revolution,230 when residents in New York, St. Louis, and other cities
protested the indecency of their living conditions and sought direct
resident control over housing operations.231 Small-scale exploratory
programs further inspired the Ford Foundation to support additional
programs in six different cities around the country. 
2 32
Programs expanded in the 1980s, as another foundation
funded resident takeovers by twelve resident groups,2 33 and
Congressman-turned-HUD Secretary Jack Kemp launched a national
campaign to encourage resident management, with the ultimate goal
of transferring legal title to the housing to residents.234 From 1988 to
1998, HUD distributed $80 million 23 in support of this goal, funding
hundreds of resident organizations nationwide and reaching tenants
at a majority of the country's larger agencies.
236
The results of these efforts were mixed. Many resident
organizations did not succeed in taking over full or partial operations,
but others thrived.237 On the one hand, these programs demonstrated
that, in some cases, resident groups could not only successfully manage
their own housing but could even outperform the government at some
tasks.238 Studies by the Ford Foundation and other organizations
suggested that successful projects commonly had strong organizations,
230. See Anne Marie Smetak, Private Funding, Public Housing: The Devil in
the Details, 21 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 1, 22 (2014).
231. See Salsich, supra note 176; Handler, Down From Bureaucracy, supra note
218, at 156-62.
232. See Susan Bennett, "The Possibility of a Beloved Place" Residents and
Placemaking in Public Housing Communities, 19 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 259
(2000) [hereinafter Bennett, Beloved Place].
233. See id. at 288.
234. See MICHAEL STEGMAN, MORE HOUSING, MORE FAIRLY: REPORT OF THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY TASK FORCE ON AFFORDABLE HOUSING, BACKGROUND PAPER
ON THE LIMITS OF PRIVATIZATION 27 (1991); Stephen B. Kinnaird, Public Housing:
Abandon Hope, But Not Privatization, 103 YALE L.J. 961 (1994).
235. See Bennett, Beloved Place, supra note 232.
236. See Stegman, supra note 234, at 83 et seq.
237. See Handler, Law and Community, supra note 228.
238. See Bennett, Beloved Place, supra note 232, at 286.
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robust resident participation, ties to supportive groups that were
independent of the local agency, and sufficient training. 239
On the other hand, many resident groups experienced
challenges. Collective governance of a shared, vital asset like housing
is difficult. Of those groups that succeeded, few could sustain their
activities once significant federal or foundation funding and other
support were withdrawn.240 Although the law still offers residents a
right of first refusal to purchase and manage their building when it is
offered for sale,241 resident control today is not a truly viable option.
ii. Culturalist Challenges to Choice
While little remains of resident management initiatives, the
sustained support that they provided for resident autonomy is striking.
Culturalism generally restricts autonomy for the poor, yet autonomy
became a centerpiece of federal public housing policy in a Republican-
led era when the "welfare queen" was a central theme in poverty
discourse. This can be explained by viewing resident management
initiatives as an expression of the culturalist impulse to reform the
poor.
Susan Bennett explains three distinct inspirations for the
resident management movement.242 One motivation was to improve
residents' quality of life and make government more accountable.
Another centered on community organizing and empowering the
resident community through collective action. And a third sought to
transform residents, both behaviorally and attitudinally, through
homeownership-like activities that required them to take
responsibility for their living environment.243 The third goal is both
consistent with culturalist ideology and the government's primary
motivation. As early as 1968, HUD saw resident management
initiatives as instilling "pride of ownership . . . and a sense of
responsibility and status" among residents.244 Federal support reached
its height under Secretary Kemp, driven by his belief in
the transformative effects of homeownership and
freedom from government dependency . . . . [His
initiatives] would 'tear down the walls that come
239. See id. One estimate suggested that up to 1,000 hours of training were
needed. See Stegman, supra note 234, at 83.
240. See Bennett, Beloved Place, supra note 232, at 289-90.
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437p(c) (2015); 24 C.F.R. § 970.13 (2010).
242. See Bennett, Beloved Place, supra note 232, at 284-85.
243. See id.
244. Smetak, supra note 230, at 22.
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between people and their self-respect ... and prevent
people from exercising their talents and reaching their
potential.'.... Kemp was after the hearts and minds
of the tenants. His was a deeply ideological vision. 245
Similarly, another conservative supporter of the program
envisioned resident management as "changing tenants' behavior from
destructive to constructive . and inspiring their neighbors" to do the
same. 246
Resident management initiatives can thus be read through a
culturalist lens. Where residents sought autonomy, dignity, and better
housing, Kemp and other culturalists saw a population in need of the
ethics of work, responsibility, and homeownership, and an opportunity
for personal and collective reformation.
There are a number of implications to the appropriation of this
dignitary initiative by culturalist ideology. First, autonomy that is
exercisable only in one prescribed manner seems inconsistent with the
classical notion of autonomy, in which "the individual determines his
or her own course of action in accordance with a plan chosen by himself
or herself.'247 Yet here, the benefits of autonomy still seem relatively
intact. That is, regardless of Kemp's motives, residents who opted into
the program still managed to secure both funding and some autonomy
over their environment. As self-managers, they might have exercised
that autonomy in ways that rebuffed culturalism, such as by halting
demeaning management policies and providing more supportive
services.248
Thus, it might seem that culturalism is less functionally
subversive in matters of choice than in matters of voice. In voice, those
in control can easily nullify any benefits by suppressing or rejecting
voice. In contrast, in choice, the autonomy that is granted remains
meaningfully exercisable by those who have successfully opted into
self-management. But this autonomy is available only to those willing
and able to invest an astounding amount of time and energy.
Moreover, an even greater hazard exists for those who cannot
succeed at the herculean task of self-management or who have
otherwise chosen to opt out. For these communities, there is no
alternative but to continue suffering from substandard housing
conditions. The culturalist perspective finds this fitting, since it views
245. Kinnaird, supra note 234, at 962.
246. Stegman, supra note 234, at 89.
247. Handler, Law and the Search for Community, supra note 218, at 15
(citations omitted).
248. See Stegman, supra note 234, at 83.
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these residents as irresponsibly rejecting or failing to take advantage
of the opportunity for betterment, and as thus undeserving of other
forms of relief. Culturalism's focus on personal reformation thus leaves
the primary problem unaddressed-that is, substandard housing
conditions.
In addition, by placing the burden on the poor to resolve their
own hardships, culturalism denies government responsibility for the
problems the poor experience. On the local level, this means that if
residents don't opt in and take responsibility, the housing simply goes
unfixed. At the national policy level, it means that the government
divests itself more broadly of its obligations to house the poor. Indeed,
Kemp was accused by a contemporary of promoting a hidden agenda of
"ending public ownership of public housing, and [of] cloak[ing] that
agenda in the rhetoric of empowerment."249 It is not a coincidence that
around this time, HUD itself was at risk of being dismantled by
Congress, and that public housing around the country was being closed
for inhabitability caused by a lack of funding and neglect.250 Reducing
the obligations of government was a larger goal of the times, and
resident management initiatives were being used to hasten this goal.
V. EXTENDING DIGNITY THROUGH MOBILITY
These examples from decades past demonstrate the
persistently subversive power of culturalism. These experiences serve
as a warning to today's policymakers to actively resist the threat of
culturalist corruption as they shape the future of the public housing
program. The threat is especially strong in the context of housing
mobility.
"Mobility" means giving public housing residents greater
choice over where they live and providing increased access to safer
neighborhoods with better public services that are otherwise reserved
for the wealthier. Like the resident management initiatives discussed
above, mobility is a mechanism of "choice" that seeks to promote the
dignity of residents by promoting their autonomy. Like other dignity
initiatives, however, mobility is also susceptible to a culturalist reading
that threatens to severely undermine its effectiveness.
249. Id. at 89 (quoting Gordon Cavanaugh of the Council for Large Public
Housing Authority); see also Robert Bodzin, Is There Hope? An Analysis of How
Premature Tenant Homeownership Policies Threaten the Housing Rights of Low
Income Persons and Families on Waiting Lists for Section 8 Housing, 4 HOFSTRA
PROP. L.J. 239, 254 (1992); Schill, supra note 158; Kinnaird, supra note 234.
250. See Powell, supra note 158.
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a. Context
Traditionally, public housing benefits entitle a person to live in
housing that is owned by the government and fixed in location.
Mobility programs generally convert public housing benefits into
benefits with locational flexibility, and in this way resemble "voucher"
or "tenant-based Section 8" benefits. Section 8 of the U.S. Housing Act
of 1937 encompasses a wide variety of programs, but it is best known
for paying subsidies to private landlords who house low-income
tenants. 251 Under tenant-based Section 8, voucher benefits can be
applied to privately owned units, which would otherwise be rented on
the open market, as long as the landlord agrees to accept the subsidies
and follow program rules. Today, a voucher tenant can even transfer
her benefits across jurisdictions,25 2 meaning that she can bring her
benefits across city or state lines without having to reapply.253 Thus,
mobility programs, which convert public housing benefits into benefits
with locational flexibility, drastically expand housing choices for public
housing residents.
25 4
251. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (2014) (authorizing legislation for an array of
programs, each of which has different requirements; most programs meet the
general description found in THE NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, HUD
HOUSING PROGRAMS, TENANTS' RIGHTS § 1.2.5 (4th ed. 2012)).
252. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f9r); 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.4 and 982.353(b); U.S. DEP'T OF
Hous. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER GUIDEBOOK (7420.10G),
13-1, http://www.hud.gov/offices/admi/hudclips/guidebooks/7420.10G/index.cfm.
253. Transferability or "portability" of benefits is especially valuable as waiting
lists are often closed and the number of applicants far exceed the number of
vouchers funded by Congress. See John J. Infranca, Housing Resource Bundles:
Distributive Justice and Federal Low-Income Housing Policy, 49 U. RICH. L. REV.
1071, n.5 (2015). For a discussion of barriers to portability, see Stefanie DeLuca
et al., Segregating Shelter: How Housing Policies Shape the Residential Locations
of Low-Income Minority Families, 647 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 268,
(2013); Susan Bennett, The Threat of the Wandering Poor: Welfare Parochialism
and Its Impact on the Use of Housing Mobility As an Anti-Poverty Strategy,
22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1207, 1228 (1995). For recent changes to the portability
regulations, see Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 80 Fed. Reg. 161 (August 20, 2015)
(to be codified at 24 CFR pt. 982), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-08-
20/html/2015-20551.htm.
254. The Section 8 or Housing Choice Voucher program itself is sometimes
viewed as a mobility program. Others do not apply that term because Section 8 does
not usually include counseling support or other forms of assistance that make
mobility programs more effective. See infra, Part V.e. For simplicity, in this article
the term "mobility programs" refers only to programs that convert traditional public
housing benefits to a form of benefits with locational flexibility, regardless of
whether they include counseling support or other assistance. Although this article
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Mobility programs support the dignity and autonomy of
residents in the sense that "[t]he ability to choose where to live and
with whom to associate is linked to the idea of freedom in the American
popular imagination."255 This particular type of freedom is especially
powerful when it enables a poor person to move from a desperately
underserved neighborhood, lacking fundamental necessities such as
public safety and quality public schools, to what is sometimes termed
a "neighborhood of opportunity."256 The great allure of mobility
programs is that they might enable poor people to escape the
deprivations associated with race-based and income-based housing
segregation.25 17 In addition, they may increase cross-cultural exposure
between whites and blacks, potentially decreasing racial bias and
tension. Moreover, they may help to diffuse the harmful consequences
of poverty among a broader segment of society, making its impact less
concentrated and less severe.
2 8
b. Experiments
A number of large-scale experiments have offered mobility
benefits to public housing residents. It should be noted at the outset
that the public housing program is in large part responsible for
creating the very problems that mobility is meant to address. Public
housing across the country notoriously and intentionally segregated
black residents by assigning them to live in densely concentrated
urban high-rise buildings. 259 Early housing mobility initiatives were in
does not focus on the traditional Housing Choice Voucher program, many of the
reforms proposed here should be applied to that program as well.
255. Michelle Adams, Separate and (Un)equal: Housing Choice, Mobility, and
Equalization in the Federally Subsidized Housing Program, 71 TUL. L. REV. 413,
424 (1996).
256. See, e.g., RAD Notice, supra note 119, at Attachment 1B, Section 1B.1 at
74 and Section 1.7.C.5 at 43-46 (referring to 24 C.F.R. 983.260 and pertaining to
two different components of RAD, respectively); see also, e.g., LEONARD S.
RUBINOWITZ AND JAMES E. ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS AND COLOR LINES:
FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA (2000).
257. See Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged, supra note 60; DOUGLAS S. MASSEY
& NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF
THE UNDERCLASS (1993).
258. Massey & Denton, supra note 257, at 128.
259. ARNOLD HIRSCH, MAKING THE SECOND GHETTO: RACE & HOUSING IN
CHICAGO 1940-1960 (1983); Florence Wagman Roisman, Intentional Racial
Discrimination and Segregation by the Federal Government As a Principal Cause of
Concentrated Poverty: A Response to Schill and Wachter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1351
(1995); see also Florence Wagman Roisman, Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial
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fact court-ordered or court-approved remedies to racial discrimination
propagated by local housing agencies.
260
The landmark Gautreaux litigation, initiated in 1966 and
formally ended thirty-two years later, relocated 7,100 families from
segregated high-rise towers in Chicago under the auspices of the court,
with over half of those households moving to primarily white
suburbs.261 Many other fair housing lawsuits followed Gautreaux's lead
in crafting remedies focused on mobility, including a 1980 suit brought
against Yonkers, a wealthy suburb of New York City,2 62 and the
Thompson v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. 263 litigation,
filed in 1995 and settled 17 years later, which focuses on encouraging
mobility throughout the Baltimore metropolitan region.
Gautreaux also inspired mobility experiments outside of the
courtroom. Congress directed HUD to conduct a large, randomized
mobility experiment in the mid-1990s, known as the Moving to
Opportunity (MTO) initiative. MTO offered vouchers to 4,600 public
housing families with children living in high poverty neighborhoods in
Chicago, Boston, Baltimore, Los Angeles, and New York, permitting
some families to relocate to only low-poverty neighborhoods, allowing
others to move to any neighborhood, and establishing a third set of
families as a control group. 
264
Discrimination and Segregation in Federally Financed Housing, 48 HOW. L.J. 913
(2005).
260. See generally Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, supra note
177.
261. See, e.g., Wilson, More Than Just Race, supra note 37, at 48; Hills v.
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 297 (1976) (affirming the appropriateness of the remedial
order in extending mobility regionally, beyond the city lines); Florence Wagman
Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in Regional Housing Markets: The
Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333,
346, 363-65 (2007) [hereinafter Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing].
262. See United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988) (Fair Housing claims resulted in a mobility
program that randomly relocated low-income black and Latino adults from poor,
racially segregated neighborhoods in Yonkers, New York, to middle-class
neighborhoods); see also Olatunde Johnson, The Last Plank: Rethinking Public and
Private Power to Advance Fair Housing, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1191 (2011).
263. Thompson v. U.S. Dep't. of Hous. and Urban Dev., 348 F.Supp.2d 398,413
(D.Md. 2005); see also Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, supra note
177.
264. See Jens Ludwig, Moving to Opportunity, 14 CITYSCAPE: J. OF POLY DEV.
& RES. 2 (2012); XAVIER DE SOUZA BRIGGS ET AL., MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY: THE
STORY OF AN AMERICAN EXPERIMENT TO FIGHT GHETTO POVERTY (2010).
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As MTO got underway, HUD also initiated the HOPE VI
program, which demolished densely concentrated public housing and
rebuilt it as mixed-income housing. HOPE VI dispersed large numbers
of the very poor and re-housed a relatively small portion of the original
residents side-by-side with people with higher incomes. HOPE VI is
usually referred to as a mixed-income program, not as a mobility
program, and, as noted, its approach was highly controversial. HOPE
VI and other mixed-income research is sometimes seen as relevant to
mobility, however, since both experiment with residential integration.
The largest mobility experiment to date is HUD's latest
initiative, the Rental Demonstration Program, which is a public
housing privatization program that includes a mobility option.26' The
demonstration program was expanded in 2014 to cover 180,000
households, and may well be expanded nationwide.
266
Two recent and significant legal developments may generate
additional momentum behind mobility programs. The Fair Housing
Act requires HUD and local jurisdictions to "affirmatively further fair
housing,"267 a provision that has long been dormant. In 2015, however,
HUD issued regulations that clarify this provision and are aimed at
"replacing segregated living patterns with truly integrated and
balanced living patterns [and] transforming racially and ethnically
concentrated areas of poverty into areas of opportunity.'26 Also in
2015, the Supreme Court held that a cause of action based on disparate
impact is cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.269 Taken together,
these two developments help to address weaknesses in the Fair
Housing Act 27 ° and may inject it with new energy, possibly spurring
265. See Lee, Rights at Risk, supra note 105, at 774; Smetak, supra note 230,
at 17.
266. Lee, Rights at Risk, supra note 105, at 768.
267. Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2) (2009).
268. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing, 80
Fed. Reg. 42271 (2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-07-16/pdf/2015-
17032.pdf.
269. See Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty Affairs v. Inclusive Comtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2510 (2015).
270. See Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, The Fair Housing Choice Myth, 33 CARDOZO
L. REV. 967, 968 (2012) (concluding that the Fair Housing Act, without regulations,
did not effectively address white resistance to mobility, offering only an "exit
strategy" from ghettoes without the necessary "entrance strategy"); see also
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new mobility initiatives both within the public housing program and
elsewhere at the local level.
271
c. Research
Mobility experiments have generated significant data
comparing the before-and-after statuses of movers. It is difficult to
generalize, but many analyses support the general idea that
environment affects a person's chances in life, although theories vary
widely as to exactly how environment matters. The early mobility
experiments provide an example of the complexities inherent in this
work. Gautreaux results were generally positive, showing significantly
better rates of employment and college attendance among relocatees
as well as lower school dropout rates.272 But a 2011 analysis from the
MTO program told a different story, concluding that relocation had
little impact on job rates or school success.27 3 Scholarly reaction to the
divergent results was described as "contentious and somewhat
politicized,"274 with supporters and opponents of mobility each
attempting to explain the results by pointing out various flaws in
project design or assessment strategies. Another study, published in
2015, is described as "vindicating" MTO; it focused on MTO children
who had relocated at a younger age and assessed them at a later point
in life; it found that they did in fact experience an increase in income
earnings and college attendance rates.
275
Overall, mobility and related studies are voluminous, diverse
in their conclusions, and raise a startlingly broad range of unanswered
questions. This point is illustrated by a brief look at just a few studies
271. For examples of mobility programs implemented by local jurisdictions, see
HOUSINGMOBILITY.ORG, http://www.housingmobility.org/ (last visited Feb. 28,
2016).
272. See Wilson, More Than Just Race, supra note 34, at 50.
273. U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. AND URB. DEV'T, MOVING TO OPPORTUNITY FOR FAIR
HOUSING DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM FINAL IMPACTS EVALUATION (Nov. 2011),
http://www.huduser.org/publications/pdf/MTOFHD fullreport v2.pdf; see also Lisa
A. Gennetian et al., The Long-Term Effects of Moving to Opportunity on Youth
Outcomes, 14 CITYSCAPE: A J. OF POLY DEV. & RES. 137, 140 (2012).
274. Thomas Edsall, Op-Ed, Does Moving Poor People Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/17/opinion/does-moving-poor-people-
work.htmL
275. See Raj Chetty et al., The Effects of Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on
Children: New Evidence From the Moving to Opportunity Experiment (May 2015),
http://www.equality-of-opportunity.orglimages/mto-paper.pdf; see also Jonathan
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chosen from perhaps many hundreds. For example, a study of the
Yonkers, New York program found positive adult employment
outcomes and less welfare dependency,27 6 while MTO found no such
changes in adults. Researchers have suggested that divergent
outcomes such as these might be due to various program design and
assessment choices, such as the amount of time elapsed between
moving and assessment (seven years and one year, respectively, in this
example), whether participants moved to neighborhoods with
significantly different demographics or to neighborhoods more like
their own, and other factors.
277
The comparison of these two studies also highlights some of the
complex questions mobility researchers face regarding the ultimate
purpose of mobility. Should mobility ultimately focus on adults or on
children? Are jobs and welfare dependency, the factors assessed in
these studies, the appropriate measures of "success," or are there other
valuable indicators? Since the Yonkers program focused on racial
desegregation and MTO only focused on income desegregation, how
does that difference affect their results, and should future programs
focus on race, income, or both? Questions like these illustrate the
complex nature of mobility analysis.
Some research even raises fundamental questions about
whether the geographic spaces known as "neighborhoods" are in fact to
blame for the harms suffered by poor people. In some studies,
researchers have documented that "toxic stress" associated with high-
poverty neighborhoods damages children's cognitive development.278
Other studies have found that poor children living in low-poverty
neighborhoods made significant gains in school. 279 However, this gain
in academic success is misleading, as two-thirds of those school gains
276. See Rebecca C. Fauth et al., Seven Years Later: Effects of a Neighborhood
Mobility Program on Poor Black and Latino Adults' Well-Being, 49 J. HEALTH &
Soc. BEHAV. 119, 124 (2008).
277. See Wilson, More Than Just Race, supra note 37, at 50-51; Barbara Sard
& Douglas Rice, Creating Opportunities for Children: How Housing Location Can
Make a Difference, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES 24-26 (Oct. 14,
2014), http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-15-14hous.pdf.
278. See Sard & Rice, supra 277, at 15-16 (stating that toxic stress caused by
living in high-poverty neighborhoods can have an especially adverse impact on
children, leading to long-term effects on cognitive development that harm
development in the areas of the brain that regulate emotion and executive
function); Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household
Dysfunction to Many of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: The Adverse
Childhood Experiences (ACE) Study, 14 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 245 (1998),
http://www.ajpmonline.org/article/S0749-3797(98)00017-8/pdf.
279. See Sard & Rice, supra note 277, at 27-29.
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were attributed to the improved school environments, not to the change
in neighborhood.280 An analysis of forty other studies that assessed the
impact on children of "neighborhood effects," such as neighborhood
ties, social control, and institutional resources, came to no conclusion
about those impacts; but it did firmly conclude that other things
unrelated to the neighborhood itself, like the family's affluence and
stability, clearly had direct and significant impacts on children's
success. 281 Thus, it is possible to question whether policymakers should
focus on moving people to different neighborhoods at all, or whether
other strategies might be more effective, such as school integration and
poverty relief.
Even this brief look at a few studies suggests the range of
complex issues mobility researchers must consider. Differing opinions
over fundamental questions make it difficult to determine whether
mobility is, overall, "effective," and why this is or is not true. Such
questions are likely to be debated for years to come.
d. Culturalist Challenges to Mobility
Empirical evidence aside, it seems relatively clear on a
conceptual evel that mobility is closely aligned with anti-culturalism.
The essential premise of mobility programs is that if an individual's
environment changes, she will fare better. Mobility theory thus does
not start from the premise that a person's flaws cause her poverty, nor
does it necessarily assume that she must change herself in order to
escape poverty. Rather, it implies that her ability to thrive depends on
her external environment. Consequently, mobility can be viewed as
emphasizing structural causes of poverty over personal or cultural
ones.
Mobility may be aligned with a general shift in public opinion
away from culturalism. A 2014 public opinion poll by NBC and the Wall
Street Journal found a twenty-point decrease, compared to nineteen
years earlier, in those who believe that poverty is primarily caused by
individuals not doing enough to help themselves (44%), along with a
corresponding rise in those who believe that poverty is primarily
caused by factors outside an individual's control (46%).22 The Center
280. See id.
281. Robert J. Sampson et al., Assessing "Neighborhood Effects". Social
Processes and New Directions in Research, 28 ANN. REV. SOC. 443, 446, 473-74
(2002).
282. Nona Willis Arnowitz, Poll: Fewer Americans Blame Poverty on the Poor,
NBCNEWS (June 20, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sightpoll-
fewer-americans-blame-poverty-poor-n136051.
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for American Progress also reported in 2014 that 64% of Americans
believe in structural causes of poverty, while only 25% believe that
most poor people "'are poor because they make bad decisions or act
irresponsibly in their own lives.'
2 3
If culturalism is indeed declining in popular opinion, it may be
attributable to the broad downturn in economic prosperity28 4 as well as
objections to the concentration of wealth in the hands of a very few.28 5
General upward socioeconomic mobility is of such broad public concern
today that it has become a talking point for leading presidential
candidates in both the Democratic and Republican parties.2 6 It seems
reasonable to hypothesize that, as more Americans suffer economic
hardship, they may be looking to government for help, turning away
from culturalism and towards structural explanations. Support for
housing mobility might be associated with this shift.
On the other hand, it is also undeniable that housing mobility
can be interpreted through a culturalist lens. HUD's rationales for the
MTO and HOPE VI experiment in the mid-1990s, for example, were
unambiguously culturalist. HUD explained that "[increasingly
segregated and isolated from the larger society and with few perceived
options, many residents of 'underclass' neighborhoods make decisions
that tend to perpetuate their poverty."2 7 A 1997 HUD report echoed
the most controversial language of the Moynihan Report of over thirty
years earlier when describing the hope that "a mixture of income levels
will reduce the social pathology caused by" concentrated poverty, and
that
[t]he behavior patterns of some lower income residents
will be altered by emulating those of their higher
income neighbors . . . [and lead] to upward mobility.
283. See JOHN HALPIN, 50 YEARS AFTER LBJ's WAR ON POVERTY: A STUDY OF
AMERICAN ATTITUDES ABOUT WORK, ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, AND THE SOCIAL
SAFETY NET 3 (Jan. 2014), https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/01/WOP-PollReport2.pdf.
284. See, e.g., Xavier de Souza Briggs, Entrenched Poverty, Social Mixing, and
the "Geography of Opportunity": Lessons for Policy and Unanswered Questions,
13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POLY 403, 405 (2006) (recognizing the role played by
housing and income instability, largely driven by a shift away from an industrial
economy, in perpetuating spatial stratification).
285. See Gilman, One Percent, supra note 3, at 391-95 (discussing the Occupy
Wall Street movement).
286. David Leonhardt et al., An Atlas of Upward Mobility Shows Paths Out of
Poverty, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/04/upshot/
an-atlas-of-upward-mobility-shows-paths-out-of-poverty.html.
287. U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., URBAN POLICY BRIEF, RESIDENTIAL
MOBILITY PROGRAMS (Sept. 1994).
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Nonworking low-income tenants will find their way
into the workplace in greater numbers because of the
social norms of their new environment (for example,
going to work/school every day) and the informal
networking with employed neighbors. 
2 88
Thus, there are two readings of mobility. Some believe that
mobility is an affirmation of one's dignity, equality, and autonomy as a
response to illegal racial discrimination. Yet mobility may also be seen
as a culturalist strategy for reforming presumed deficiencies of
morality and culture. Past experiences of voice and choice, in which
dignitary rights have been appropriated as tools of subordination,
serve as a caution. As mobility programs are pursued, it is critical to
raise awareness of how culturalist assumptions might affect their
design and implementation and undermine their effectiveness as an
anti-poverty strategy.
Perhaps the primary risk is that mobility is viewed as an
opportunity to "pull oneself up by one's bootstraps," and that if a person
does not avail herself of this opportunity, then she does not deserve to
escape poverty's ills. Mobility can be seen as a means of separating the
strivers from the non-strivers, and the deserving from the undeserving.
Those who have an opportunity to participate in mobility, but choose
not to, may be left without other options.
The notion that mobility separates the deserving and the
undeserving has already surfaced in the debate over mobility research.
Some have argued that the Gautreaux litigants, who opted in to the
settlement, were more likely than the average public housing resident
288. Id. Overall, these theories appear to be refuted. Some researchers found
no compelling evidence to support HUD's mixed-income theories, though they did
find some evidence of the benefits of access to higher-quality services and greater
informal social controls. Mark L. Joseph et al., The Theoretical Basis for Addressing
Poverty Through Mixed-Income Development, 42 URB. AFF. REV. 369, 372, 386-88,
392-95 (2007); Mark L. Joseph, Is Mixed-Income Development an Antidote to Urban
Poverty?, 17 Hous. POLY DEBATE 209 (2006). Other researchers found no
conclusive evidence of any of those benefits, and concluded that "the degree of
neighborhood change is not statistically related to changes in individual outcomes."
George C. Galster et al., Income Diversity Within Neighborhoods and Very-Low-
Income Families, 2 CITYSCAPE: J. OF POLY DEV. & RES. 257, 292-93 (2008). Yet a
popular press account suggests that some movers themselves embrace culturalist
theory, reporting one participant as stating that "'[s]eeing people getting up every
day and working, wanting to get something out of life-it taught [my family] better
values' than they were exposed to in the projects." Alana Semuels, Is Ending
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to thrive from a change in environment because they were "self-
selected," that is, they had taken the initiative to litigate and to
relocate. 29 The culturalist presumption is that such strivers are
anomalies among the poor, and that improved outcomes are not due to
a change in environment but to their own personal will and
determination. Moreover, the implication is that those who did not
litigate or relocate failed to do so only because they are not similarly
motivated toward success.
The culturalist reading of mobility may be bolstered by data
showing that many who have an opportunity to relocate do not move
to "neighborhoods of opportunity," but rather move to neighborhoods
with poverty rates and racial demographics similar to their initial
neighborhoods.290 Culturist ideology views these residents as illogically
rejecting opportunity for betterment and blames them for perpetuating
their own poverty. In doing so, culturist ideology delegitimizes the
many structural reasons that individuals may choose to relocate to
neighborhoods with similar demographics rather than to
"neighborhoods of opportunity."
Of the many structural obstacles that exist, some of the most
important are a shortage of appropriate housing, racial discrimination,
the burdens of mobility, and disagreement with the culturalist
implications of mobility. First, in terms of supply, mobility's success
depends on the availability of enough suitable housing located in target
neighborhoods.29' Private-sector landlords must be willing to endure
bureaucratic hassles, additional inspections, and in many cases, below-
market rents set by the government. 292 Other barriers include the fact
that many target neighborhoods have few rental units, especially for
larger families, along with the fact that new affordable units built with
289. See Wilson, supra note 37, at 48-49.
290. See, e.g., Roisman, Keeping the Promise, supra note 259, at 925-26 (while
Section 8 holds promise for desegregation, it has not attained that promise and
remains highly segregated); Congressional testimony of Edward Goetz, Academic
Perspectives, supra note 171, at 13.
291. See, e.g., Molly Thompson, Relocating From the Distress of Chicago Public
Housing to the Difficulties of the Private Market: How the Move Threatens to Push
Families Away From Opportunity, 1 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 267, 295-96 (2006).
292. Subsidy levels are often too low to enable renters to afford rents in
"neighborhoods of opportunity," since they are based on the average fair market
rent for an entire metropolitan region. However, HUD intends to propose
calculations based on smaller geographic areas to allow for higher subsidies in
certain markets. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Establishing a Fair Market Rent
(FMR) System, 80 Fed. Reg. 31,332 (proposed June 2, 2015) (to be codified at 24
C.F.R. pt. 888).
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federal tax subsidies are also often built in poor, segregated
neighborhoods.293
Aside from limited housing supply-which is itself an
exclusionary tactic294 -public housing residents face other steep
barriers to mobility. Racial discrimination in the housing market
remains rampant.2 95 Moreover, culturalist attitudes toward black
Americans are persistent and growing. While polls previously cited
suggest hat culturalism is on the wane, those polls did not ask about
race. A 2014 Pew Research Center poll inquired specifically about
culturalism towards blacks, and found starkly different attitudes: 63%
of respondents felt that "blacks who have not gotten ahead in life are
mainly responsible for their own situation,"296 representing a 7%
increase since 1995. Thus, even if culturalism generally may be
decreasing, culturalism against blacks specifically may be rising, and
293. The program that produces the vast majority of new federally subsidized
rental units, the low-income housing tax credit program, is well-known for this. See,
e.g., Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and Community Revitalization: Applying the
Fair Housing Act to the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1747,
1753 (2005); Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Comtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2510 (2015).
294. See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and
Exclusion at the Urban Fringe, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1147 (2008).
295. See, e.g., Margery Austin Turner, Limits on Housing and Neighborhood
Choice: Discrimination and Segregation in U.S. Housing Markets, 41 IND. L. REV.
797, 799-800 (2008); John A. Powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future:
The Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 605, 613 (2008); STACY SEICSHNAYDRE &
ROBERT C. ALBRIGHT, EXPANDING CHOICE AND OPPORTUNITY IN THE HOUSING
CHOICE VOLUNTEER PROGRAM 4 (July 2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/gnocdc/
reports/The+Data+Center-Expanding+Housing+Choice+in+New+Orleans.pdf
(reporting that in post-Katrina New Orleans, where thousands of public housing
residents were given mobility vouchers because their housing was declared
uninhabitable, 50 units in wealthier neighborhoods were tested for fair housing
concerns and "44 percent of African American testers . . . received less favorable
treatment than their white counterparts. This included property owners and
managers who refused to respond to inquiries or show the apartment, failed to
provide rental applications, quoted less favorable terms and incentives, and
imposed stricter standards."). Even whites who identify as supporting integration
largely relocate to areas that are less diverse than what they describe as their ideal
neighborhood. Maria Krysan, with Esther Havekes & Michael D.M. Bader, Diverse
Neighborhoods: The (Mis)Match Between Attitudes and Actions, 24 POVERTY &
RACE 9, 9-11 (July/Aug. 2015); see also Adams, supra note 255, at 455 (discussing
contradiction among whites' support for, and the resistance to, integration).
296. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, 2014 POLITICAN POLARIZATION AND TYPOLOGY
SURVEY FINAL TOPLINE 8-9 (2014), http://www.people-press.org/files/2014/06/
2014-Polarization-Topline-for-Release.pdf
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discrimination is very likely to remain an emphatic barrier to their
mobility.
In addition to challenges of supply and racial resistance, there
are various other reasons public housing residents might not
participate in mobility. They may simply wish to or need to remain in
public housing because of the heavier burdens of relocating to
privately-owned housing,297 including the challenges of finding
available housing in unfamiliar neighborhoods,298 stricter landlord
screening and behavioral controls,299 the added costs of utilities and
security deposits, and much greater housing instability, given that
private landlords often can refuse to renew a lease at the end of a term,
while government landlords cannot.300
Finally, it is critical to recognize that residents may opt out of
mobility simply because they do not desire mobility as a way of life.
The deprivations of poor neighborhoods are well-publicized, especially
those of urban minority neighborhoods, yet many poor communities
provide benefits that residents may not wish to forgo, such as ties to
friends and family, familiarity, and a sense of home.30 1 Residents may
also fear discrimination, harassment, and isolation30 2 in new
neighborhoods where they are not welcome and do not "belong."0 3 Such
fears are not merely imaginary or theoretical; MTO studies suggest
that boys who relocated suffered significantly increased rates of
depression, conduct disorder, and post-traumatic stress disorder in
297. See Thompson, supra note 291, at 281.
298. See Stefanie DeLuca, Philip M. E. Garboden, Peter Rosenblatt,
Segregating Shelter: How Housing Policies Shape the Residential Locations of Low-
Income Minority Families, 647 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 268, 289 (2013).
299. See supra Part III.d.
300. See supra Part III.b.2 (discussing Joy v. Daniel's extension of due process
to require renewal of public housing leases unless there is good cause for
termination). Most mobility programs do not incorporate this benefit, although the
Rental Demonstration Program does. See RAD Notice, supra note 119.
301. See, e.g., PUBLIC HOUSING MYTHS, PERCEPTION, REALITY, AND SOCIAL
POLICY 26-28, (Nicholas Dagen Bloom & Fritz Umbach, Lawrence J. Vale eds.
2015); Lynne C. Manzo et al., "Moving Three Times Is Like Having Your House on
Fire Once": The Experience of Place and Impending Displacement Among Public
Housing Residents, 45 URB. STUD. J. 1855, 1860 (2007).
302. See Michelle Adams, Separate and (Un)equal: Housing Choice, Mobility,
and Equalization in the Federally Subsidized Housing Program, 71 TUL. L. REV.
413, 479 (1996); Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 288-
89 (2006).
303. Adams, Radical Integration, supra note 302, at 264; see also Audrey G.
McFarlane, Who Fits the Profile?: Thoughts on Race, Class, Clusters, and
Redevelopment, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 877, 889 (2006) (discussing exclusion based
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comparison to boys who did not move,3°4 and physical violence and
other crimes against non-whites in white neighborhoods are not
uncommon.3 0 5 Moreover, relocation may simply be unappealing to
those who reject its culturalist implications, including that a successful
life depends on assimilating with wealthier people of different races,
and on rejecting the community that one already calls home. 306
e. Thwarting Culturalism
As mobility programs expand, care must be taken to prevent
culturalist ideology from undermining their potential. Given how
deeply embedded race and class discrimination is in American housing
patterns,3 7 it will take intense effort to create effective mobility
opportunities. Supply must be increased by raising funding, and both
sticks and carrots are likely necessary to increase the number of
participating landlords and jurisdictions. For example, some cities
have prohibited landlords from discriminating on the basis of "type of
income" so that all must accept mobility benefits.0 8 Such legislative
actions are very rare,30 9 but may increase due to the newly-revived risk
of litigation under the Fair Housing Act.310
304. See Ronald C. Kessler, et al., Associations of Housing Mobility
Interventions for Children in High-Poverty Neighborhoods With Subsequent Mental
Disorders During Adolescence, 311.9 JAMA 937, 946-47 (Mar. 5, 2014),
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?articleid=1835504.
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Zimmerman, and the Resistance to Blacks as Neighbors, 95 B.U. L. REV. 851 (2015)
(documenting and analyzing 430 "anti-integrationist" incidents reported in the
news media between 1990 and 2010).
306. See Adams, Radical Integration, supra note 302, at 264, 268 (discussing
that "to the extent that integration signals assimilation, integration no longer
appeals to many blacks").
307. For an exploration of the ways in which class discrimination permeates
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of Class in Land Use, 22 J.L. & POL. 33 (2006).
308. POVERTY & RACE RESEARCH ACTION COUNCIL, EXPANDING CHOICE:
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AppendixB.pdf.
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Recent changes in the law require some mobility programs to
offer extensive counseling to increase awareness of the benefits of
moving and to help those who wish to move locate units in unfamiliar
neighborhoods.3 1 1 However, receiving governments, neighbors, schools,
landlords, and employers should also receive counseling, and should be
required to affirmatively support mobility, so that the burden of
making integration a healthy process is not placed solely on movers.
Mobility programs should furthermore assist movers with access to
employment, education, childcare, and transportation.
For those who do not desire mobility, it must be recognized that
supporting their dignity and autonomy means respecting and
supporting that preference, and actively combatting culturalist
backlash against them. The risk is that nonparticipators will be
stigmatized as failing to seize an opportunity for a better life,
unmotivated toward success, and undeserving of alternative options.
The culturalist conclusion will be that government need not do
anything further to support a decent quality of life for those who
remain in poor, minority neighborhoods.
It is imperative to repudiate insinuations that government has
met its responsibility to public housing residents by offering, to a small
number of poor people, a slight opportunity to flee from other poor
people. Resisting this outcome means that advocates and policymakers
must not focus on mobility to the exclusion of other housing policies 12
311. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Housing Choice Voucher Program:
Streamlining the Portability Process, 80 Fed. Reg. 50,564 (Aug. 13, 2015) (to be
codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 982), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-08-
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program, which is a common vehicle for implementing mobility. It requires housing
agencies to brief program participants on the benefits of living in wealthier
neighborhoods and to provide listings of landlords with properties in such
neighborhoods. Such counseling is commonly recommended to make mobility
programs more effective. See, e.g., Xavier de Souza Briggs & Margery Austin
Turner, Assisted Housing Mobility and the Success of Low-Income Minority
Families: Lessons for Policy, Practice, and Future Research, 1Nw. J.L. & SOC. POLY
25 (2006) (discussing the importance of counseling to the effectiveness of mobility
programs). Suits brought by public housing residents have resulted in settlements
that include requirements of greater mobility counseling and support. See, e.g.,
Settlement Agreement and Enforcement Order, Mendonsa v. Lowell Hous. Auth.,
Civil No. 01-2034 C (Mass. Dist. Ct. June 19, 2008), http://www.povertylaw.org
poverty-law-library/case/54200/54284; Consent Decree, Jones v. HUD, No. 07 C
50142 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 24, 2008).
312. For explorations of how the benefits of integration may be reconciled with
support for black identity and community, see Adams, Radical Integration, supra
note 302, at 266; Adams, Separate and (Un)equal, supra note 302, at 464, 473
(discussing additional "in-place" or "equalization" remedies to racial segregation,
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and that other options must be simultaneously pursued. One option is
to improve existing public housing through adequate funding and
through much more intensive monitoring and enforcement.3 13 Another
is to significantly expand the Choice Neighborhoods Initiative, which
focuses on improving safety and schools in public housing
neighborhoods while also preserving long-term housing affordability
and keeping existing communities intact. 314 Such "in-place"
approaches hare a commitment to raising the quality of services while
minimizing displacement of the people in that neighborhood. In-place
approaches should not only be pursued along with mobility, but should
be given at least equal priority.
In sum, mobility programs must be designed to ensure that
mobility is truly feasible in order to have any effect on reducing
poverty. Equally as important, non-mobility options must enable
residents to thrive in place. Mobility must be offered as just one viable
option within a larger system of alternatives if dignity, autonomy, and
equality are to flourish.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to highlight culturalism's impact on
antipoverty programs, and to demonstrate its power to undermine
even those legal rights designed to repudiate it. It discusses past
examples of this problem, as well as the present-day risk that housing
mobility initiatives may become yet another test of who is worthy and
who is not.
One response is to continue to develop laws that promote the
dignity, autonomy, and equality of people in poverty. This must occur
not just in affordable housing law and in other areas of antipoverty
including code enforcement, enhanced tenant services, and the improvement of
physical conditions, public services, and environmental concerns); Mary Patillo,
Investing in Poor Black Neighborhoods "As Is", in PUBLIC HOUSING AND THE
LEGACY OF SEGREGATION (Margery Austin Turner et al. eds. 2009).
313. See Lee, Rights at Risk, supra note 105.
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begun in 2010 that, along with Promise Neighborhoods, a program inspired by the
Harlem Children's Zone, coordinates between HUD and the Departments of
Education, Health and Human Services, Justice, and Treasury and their local
counterparts. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV.,
CHOICE NEIGHBORHOODS (2015), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportaltHUD?src=/
program..offices/public-indian housingprograms/phlcn; Racquel Russell, Building
Neighborhoods of Opportunity, THE WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 10, 2012, 5:49 PM),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/0110/building-neighborhoods-opportunity.
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law, but in other realms as well, including antidiscrimination and
constitutional law, business and criminal law, property and tax law,
education law, and the law of the political sphere.
Expanded legal rights may not be enough, however. Public
housing history illustrates how readily new dignitary rights can be
undermined, suggesting that something more is required to diminish
culturalism's power. A more fundamental change must occur: society
must focus not on changing the beliefs and behavior of poor people, but
instead on changing the beliefs and behavior of the non-poor. Achieving
such a shift would be a monumental task, but it may be essential to
the fight against poverty.
